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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Defendant/Petitioner Timothy A. Dunlap appeals his death sentence imposed after 
resentencing and the district court's denial of post-conviction relief. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of The Underlying Criminal Proceedings 
The facts leading to Dunlap's conviction for first-degree murder are summarized III 
Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 55,106 P.3d 376 (2005) (footnote omitted), as follows: 
On October 16, 1991, Dunlap entered and robbed the Security State Bank 
in Soda Springs, Idaho. Dunlap entered the bank, stood within a few feet of bank 
teller Tonya Crane, and ordered her to give him all of her money. Without 
hesitation, Tonya Crane did so. Dunlap immediately and calmly pulled the trigger 
of his sawed-off shotgun, which was less than two feet from Tonya Crane's chest, 
literally blowing her out of her shoes. Police officers responded immediately. 
When the officers arrived at the bank, Tonya Crane had no pulse. When taken to 
the hospital she was pronounced dead on arrival. 
Dunlap fled the scene, but subsequently surrendered to police. After being 
given his Miranda rights, Dunlap confessed to the murder and to a murder that 
occurred ten days before in Ohio. The following day, Dunlap again confessed 
and explained how he planned and completed both murders. Dunlap was charged 
with first-degree murder and robbery. 
Within days of his arrest, Dunlap arranged to be interviewed by Marilyn 
Young, Associate Editor of the Albany New Tribune in Indiana. During the 
interviews Dunlap explained to Young how he murdered his girlfriend (Belinda 
Belanos) in Ohio with a crossbow and then traveled west where he subsequently 
planned to rob the Soda Springs' bank. Dunlap described the bank robbery and 
Tonya Crane's murder to the editor. 
Dunlap was charged with first-degree murder and robbery. (#19928 R., pp.6-7.) 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, he pled guilty to first-degree murder and use of a firearm; the 
robbery charge was dismissed. (Id., pp.165-73.) After a sentencing hearing (id., pp.290-93), he 
was sentenced to death (id., pp.354-86). His conviction and death sentence were affirmed. State 
v. Dunlap, 125 Idaho 530, 873 P.2d 784 (1993). 
With the assistance of new counsel, Dunlap filed a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief 
(#22087 R., pp.I-83), which was dismissed because it was untimely (id., pp.143-150). This 
Court reversed. Dunlap v. State, 131 Idaho 576, 961 P .2d 1179 (1998). On remand, based upon 
the state's concession that error occurred during sentencing proceedings (#28269 Tr., pp.120-
21), the district court ordered a new sentencing, but denied Dunlap's guilt-phase post-conviction 
claims (#28269 R, pp.694-763). Denial of guilt-phase post-conviction relief was affirmed and 
Dunlap's case remanded "for further proceedings on sentencing." See Dunlap, 141 Idaho at 66. 
Dunlap was resentenced before a jury, which found three statutory aggravating factors, 
conducted appropriate weighing, and concluded Dunlap should be sentenced to death. (#32773 
R, pp.686-88.) Judgment was filed February 22, 2006. (Id., pp.682-86.) Dunlap filed a timely 
Notice of Appeal on March 16,2006. (Id., pp.721-23.) 
Dunlap filed his initial post-conviction petition on April 5, 2006 (#37270 R, pp.I-41) 
and a final amended petition (id., pp. 751-1093). The state filed an answer (id., pp.1190-1342) 
and Motion for Summary Dismissal (id., pp.1545-47), which the district court granted on 
November 24, 2009 (id., pp.1940-2012). On December 9, 2009, Dunlap filed a Motion for 
Decision, contending the district court had not addressed all of his post-conviction claims (id., 
pp.2015-18), and on December 18,2009, a Motion for Reconsideration (id., p.2019), both of 
which were denied by the Honorable Mitchell W. Brown] on April 24, 2010 (#32773 
R.Supp.VoU, pp.200-17).2 Dunlap filed timely notices of appeal. (#37270 R, pp.2034-44.) 
I The Honorable Don L. Harding presided over Dunlap's resentencing and post-conviction 
proceedings until November 24,2009. Thereafter, Judge Brown presided over Dunlap's case. 
2 The documents in the "Augmentation Record" are filed under #32773 and contained in two 
volumes, but are not consecutively numbered. The state will refer to the "Augmentation Record" as 
"#32773 R.Supp." and reference the volume and page numbers consecutively. 
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ISSUES 
The state wishes to rephrase the issues on appeal as follows: 
1. Has Dunlap failed to establish the alleged error stemming from the district court's five 
minute limitation for individual voir dire, raised for the first time on appeal, constitutes 
fundamental error entitling him to another resentencing? 
2. Has Dunlap failed to establish the district court abused its discretion by denying his 
motion to excuse two veniremen for cause when he did not challenge the veniremen who 
actually sat on his jury? 
3. Has Dunlap failed to establish his jury instruction claims, raised for the first time on 
appeal, constitute fundamental error entitling him to another resentencing? 
4. Has Dunlap failed to establish the jury's knowledge of his prior Idaho death sentence, 
raised for the first time on appeal, constitutes fundamental error? 
5. Has Dunlap failed to establish the failure to sequester the jury during all of the 
resentencing hearing, raised for the first time on appeal, is fundamental error? 
6. Has Dunlap failed to establish the district court abused its discretion by denying his 
request to have a second expert witness testify live since the court granted his request to 
appoint his first expert who testified at the resentencing and the second expert's prior 
post-conviction testimony was read to the jury? 
7. Because of Dunlap's failure to provide authority to support his claim, should this Court 
decline to address the district court's alleged "active role in the finances"? 
8. Has Dunlap failed to establish the lack of his presence at two chamber conferences and 
not having those conferences recorded, raised for the first time on appeal, constitutes 
fundamental error entitling him to another resentencing? 
9. Has Dunlap failed to establish the district court's acquiescence, based upon his attorney's 
decision not to question the juror who was allegedly talking on a cell phone, raised for 
the first time on appeal, constitutes fundamental error? 
10. Has Dunlap failed to establish the allegations of prosecutorial misconduct stemming from 
statements the prosecutor made during voir dire, opening statement, and closing 
argument, raised for the first time on appeal, constitute fundamental error? 
11. Has Dunlap failed to establish the district court's decision not to subject the state's 
evidence to Idaho's rules of evidence constitutes fundamental error? 
12. Has Dunlap failed to establish his claim regarding the utter disregard aggravator and "law 
of the case" doctrine constitutes fundamental error? 
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13. Has Dunlap failed to establish his claim that the "utter disregard" aggravator is 
unconstitutionally vague because it was submitted to a jury as opposed to a judge, raised 
for the first time on appeal, constitutes fundamental error? 
14. Has Dunlap failed to establish his claims regarding the admission of various reports 
violates the Confrontation Clause or Fifth Amendment, raised for the first time on appeal, 
constitute fundamental error entitling him to another resentencing? 
15. Has Dunlap failed to establish his claim that Idaho's death penalty violates the Eighth 
Amendment because it permits the execution of mentally ill murderers, raised for the first 
time on appeal, constitutes fundamental error? 
16. Based upon Dunlap's failure to demonstrate any error, does his claim of cumulative 
sentencing error fail? 
17. Has Dunlap failed to establish the court abused its discretion during post-conviction 
proceedings by denying his request to test the weapons used to murder Tonya and 
Belinda when he failed to establish testing was necessary to protect his substantial rights? 
18. Has Dunlap failed to establish the district court abused its discretion by denying his 
motion to disqualify for cause during post-conviction proceedings because he failed to 
establish judicial bias or that the judge was a necessary witness? 
19. Has Dunlap failed to establish the state withheld exculpatory evidence, that the pleadings 
from his pro se civil rights law suit would have resulted in a different outcome, and that 
Dr. Matthews' testimony was false? 
20. Has Dunlap failed to establish the district court erred by summarily dismissing his claims 
regarding alleged juror use of extrinsic evidence and bias? 
21. Has Dunlap failed to establish the district court erred by dismissing his ineffective 
assistance of counsel ("lAC") claim regarding counsels' handling of the court's decision 
to limit individual voir dire to five minutes? 
22. Has Dunlap failed to establish the district court erred by summarily dismissing his claim 
of lAC based upon the jury knowing Dunlap had been on death row? 
23. Has Dunlap failed to establish the district court erred by dismissing his claim of lAC 
based upon counsels' decision not to question a juror allegedly seen talking on a phone? 
24. Has Dunlap failed to establish the district court erred by summarily dismissing his lAC 
claim based upon the reports and information from Doten, Dr. Estess, and Dr. Brook? 
25. Has Dunlap failed to establish the district court erred by summarily dismissing his claim 
ofIAC stemming from counsels' decisions regarding venue? 
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26. Has Dunlap failed to establish the district court erred by summarily dismissing his lAC 
claim based upon being shackled by a leg brace that was not visible to the jury, and the 
presence of three or four officers in the courtroom? 
27. Has Dunlap failed to establish counsels' investigation and presentation of mitigation was 
objectively unreasonable and that additional mitigation unearthed during post-conviction 
proceedings would have changed the outcome of his sentence? 
28. Has Dunlap failed to establish the district court erred by summarily dismissing his lAC 
claim based upon the manner in which exhibits A through Y were admitted? 
, 29. Has Dunlap failed to establish counsel were ineffective based upon their tactical decision 
to not attend his interview with Dr. Matthews? 
30. Has Dunlap failed to establish the district court erred by summarily dismissing his lAC 
claim based upon counsels' decision to not medicate him during resentencing? 
31. Has Dunlap failed to establish the district court erred by summarily dismissing his lAC 
claim based upon counsels' advice and preparation for his allocution? 
32. Has Dunlap failed to establish the district court's decision to grant the state's Motion for 
Summary Dismissal was influenced by his commitment to serve a church mission? 
ARGUMENT 
1. 
The Limitation On Individual Voir Dire Claim Was Not Preserved For Appeal 
A. Introduction And Relevant Facts3 
The district court denied Dunlap's initial motion for individual voir dire (32773 Tr. 1-6-
06, pp.4-15; #32773 R., pp.504-07). After the state filed a motion for voir dire (id., pp.570-74), 
the court reconsidered, permitting the parties five minutes of individual voir dire (#32773 Tr. 2-
2-06, pp.1-6). The, veniremen also completed "an extensive questionnaire, which gave both 
parties a substantial amount of background information" (#32773 R., pp.504, 731, exhibit 0) and 
general group voir dire was conducted (#32773 Tr.Vol.I, pp.9-69; #37270 Tr.2-6-06, pp.1-23). 
3 In the heading of this claim and throughout his brief, Dunlap cites the state constitution. Any 
claim under Idaho's constitution must be rejected because Dunlap fails to explain why greater 
protection is warranted under the federal Constitution. See State v. Osweiler, 140 Idaho 824, 
827, 103 P.3d 437 (2004). 
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Dunlap contends the district court abused its discretion by unconstitutionally limiting 
individual voir dire to five minutes. (Brief, pp.6-9.) Because Dunlap did not object to the five 
minute limitation and has failed to demonstrate fundamental error, this issue fails on appea1.4 
. B. Standard Of Review 
"The standard of review for a district court's limitations on jury voir dire is an abuse of 
discretion standard." State v. Daniels, 134 Idaho 896, 898, 11 P.3d 1114 (2000). 
C. Dunlap Has Failed To Establish Fundamental Error 
As he concedes, Dunlap did not object to the district court's five minute limitation. 
(Brief, p.8) "It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely objection must be 
made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for appeal." State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 
398, 3 P.3d 67 (Ct. App. 2000). Whether the issue was preserved is a "threshold" inquiry. State 
v. Stevens, 115 Idaho 457, 459, 767 P.2d 832 (Ct. App. 1989). Absent a timely objection, the 
appellate courts of this state will only review an alleged error under the fundamental error 
doctrine. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, ----, 245 P.3d 961, 979 (2010). Review under the 
fundamental error doctrine requires Dunlap demonstrate the error he alleges: "(1) violates one or 
more of [his] unwaived constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need for any 
additional information not contained in the appellate record, including information as to whether 
the failure to object was a tactical decision); and (3) was not harmless." Id. at 980. 
Dunlap's claim fails the first prong because he has not established the court's limitation 
violated his constitutional rights. "A defendant's right to an impartial jury includes the right to 
an adequate voir dire to identify unqualified jurors." Wilson v. Sirmons, 536 F.3d 1064, 1098 
(loth Cir. 2008) (citing Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 729 (1992)). However, "[t]here is no 
4 Dunlap raises several lAC claims in the direct appeal section of his brief (Brief, pp.6-54), which 
will be addressed below in section XXI. 
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absolute constitutional right to individual voir dire in capital cases," id., because "a trial court has 
, broad discretion in conducting the voir dire of the jury, and particularly in phrasing the questions 
to be asked." Kasi v. Angelone, 300 F.3d 487, 511 (4th Cir. 2002) (quote and citation omitted); 
see also Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 594 (1976) (voir dire is left to the trial court's 
discretion); Deel v. Jago, 967 F.2d 1079, 1087 (6th Cir. 1992) (citing Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 
U.S. 415, 424 (1991). Not only has Dunlap failed to cite any authority establishing a 
constitutional right to individual voir dire, in Berryhill v. Zant, 858 F.2d 633, 643 (11 th Cir. 
1988) (Clark, 1., dissenting), it was recognized, "No court has held that an individualized 
segregated voir dire is constitutionally required." State v. Larsen, 129 Idaho 294, 297, 923 P.2d 
1001 (Ct. App. 1996), is not contrary because the defendants did not question the time limit 
placed upon voir dire, but the "method of deciding whether to modify its previously imposed 
time limit." In Dunlap's case, the state proposed a five minute individual voir dire, but the 
decision was left to the district court. Salazar v. State, 823 P.2d 273, 274 (Nev. 1991), and State 
v. Williams, 860 P.2d 860, 862-63 (Or. Ct. App. 1993), are inapposite because they are based 
upon state law and there was not "an extensive questionnaire" (#32773 R., p.504) or general voir 
dire by the court and parties. 
Dunlap has not established the alleged error is "clear or obvious, without the need for any 
additional information not contained in the appellate record, including information as to whether 
the failure to object was a tactical decision." Perry, 245 P.3d at 980 (parenthesis omitted). 
Dunlap's attorneys, having their initial motion for voir dire denied, were undoubtedly satisfied 
the court gave them five minutes of individual voir dire, believing it was sufficient to complete 
the questioning they desired, particularly in conjunction with the jury questionnaire and group 
voir dire. Counsel is not mandated to object when the objection will be overruled. As explained 
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in Lowry v. Lewis, 21 F.3d 344, 346 (9th Cir. 1994) (quotes and citations omitted), such an 
argument can be accepted "only if based on the proposition that a defendant has everything to 
gain and nothing to lose." Because counsels' decision to not object was tactical, Dunlap's claim 
fails under E.sTIy's second prong. Moreover, in State v. Lankford, 113 Idaho 688, 693 n.3, 747 
P.2d 71 ° (1987), this Court explained, "There is simply no error in using a voir dire procedure 
which both counsel agreed was designed to assure the selection of a fair and impartial jury." 
The final element of fundamental error mandates Dunlap establish the error was not 
harmless, E.sTIy 245 P.3d at 980, requiring he "demonstrate that the error did affect the 
outcome," id. at 977 (emphasis original). Not only is there no evidence supporting the 
conclusion that if additional voir dire had been permitted the jury would have imposed anything 
but a death sentence, there is insufficient evidence supporting a claim any juror "had formed an 
opinion as to defendant's [sentence]." State v. Leavitt, 116 Idaho 285, 289,775 P.2d 599 (1989). 
II. 
Dunlap Has Failed To Establish The Court Abused Its Discretion By Declining To Excuse Two 
Veniremen Who Did Not Sit As Jurors At His Resentencing 
A. Introduction And Relevant Facts 
Dunlap challenged venireman Mansfield for cause "based upon his statement that if it is 
premeditated or if it is committed during a felony, that the death penalty should be imposed," 
which the district court denied. (#32773 Tr.Vol.IV, pp.102-03.) Dunlap used a peremptory 
challenge to remove I'v1ansfield. (Id., p.187.) Dunlap also challenged venireman Mickelson for 
cause "( d]ue to his friendship with Margo May, a witness, with his business operation, missing a 
meeting and his personal feelings about this case," which the district court denied. (Id., pp.164-
66.) Dunlap used a preemptory challenge to remove Mickelson. (Id., p.188.) Both parties 
passed for cause the veniremen chosen to sit on the jury. (Id., Vol.V, p.3.) 
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Dunlap contends the district court unconstitutionally abused its discretion by rejecting his 
motion to excuse Mansfield and Mickelson for cause, forcing him to use peremptory challenges 
to remove them from the jury. (Brief, pp.9-11.) Because he did not challenge for cause any of 
the veniremen that actually sat as jurors and establish they were actually biased, the claim fails. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"The decision to excuse potential jurors is within the discretion of the trial court." State 
v. Hairston, 133 Idaho 496, 506, 988 P.2d 1170 (1999). 
C. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion 
Dunlap's claim is governed by Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 83 (1988), where the 
defendant contended he was denied the right to an impartial jury and due process because the 
trial court denied his motion to excuse a venireman for cause, forcing him to use a peremptory 
challenge to remove the venireman from the jury. The Court rejected this argument, explaining, 
"We have long recognized that peremptory challenges are not of constitutional dimension. They 
are a means to achieve the end of an impartial jury. So long as the jury that sits is impartial, the 
fact that the defendant had to use a peremptory challenge to achieve that result does not mean the 
Sixth Amendment was violated." rd. at 88 (citations omitted); see also State v. Ramos, 119 
Idaho 568, 569-70,808 P.2d 1313 (1991). Dunlap's reliance upon State v. Hauser, 143 Idaho 
603, 610, 150 P.3d 296 (2006), is misplaced. As recognized in State v. Ellington, m Idaho ---, 
253 P.3d 727, 743 n.l4 (2011), the challenged juror in Hauser admitted being bias and also sat 
on the jury. Because the challenged juror in Dunlap's case did not sit on the jury, his claim fails. 
Finally, any alleged error was harmless because neither of the two veniremen sat on the 
jury and Dunlap has failed to establish how his use of preemptory challenges to replace them 
contributed to his conviction when there is no jury bias. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 
9 
18, 24 (1967) ("there was no reasonable possibility that such evidence complained of contributed 
to the conviction"); State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 574, 199 P.3d 123 (2008). 
III. 
Dunlap's Jury Instruction Claims Were Not Preserved For Appeal 
A. Introduction And Relevant Facts 
At the conclusion of the evidence, the district court advised the parties to come prepared 
the next morning to discuss objections to the instructions; none are reflected in the record. 
(#32773 Tr.Vol.XI, p.186.) Dunlap raises four claims regarding the instructions and contends 
the jury should have submitted written findings. (Brief, pp.17-18.) Because Dunlap failed to 
object to the instructions or request the jury make written findings and has failed to demonstrate 
fundamental error, these claims fail. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"Whether jury instructions fairly and adequately present the issues and state the 
applicable law is a question of law over with this Court exercises free review." State v. 
Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 600, 247 P.3d 582 (2010) (quote and citation omitted). 
C. Dunlap Has Failed To Establish Fundamental Error 
Fundamental error as defined in Perry, 245 P.3d at 980, has been applied when the 
defendant fails to object to jury instructions. State v. Grove, 2011 WL 1085996, *10 (Idaho Ct. 
App. 2011). An erroneous instruction rises to the level of a constitutional violation only where 
"there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way that 
violates the Constitution." Jones v. U.S., 527 U.S. 373, 390 (1999) (internal quotes and citation 
omitted). An instruction that reduces the state's burden of proof, for example, violates the right 
to a jury trial, because such an error would "vitiate[] all the jury's factual findings." Sullivan v. 
Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 281 (1993). Likewise, removing from the jury a decision on elements 
10 
of the crime can implicate the constitutional right to a jury. Morissette v. U.S., 342 U.S. 246, 
275 (1952). However, instructions must be reviewed "as a whole, not individually, to determine 
whether the jury was properly and adequately instructed." Shackelford, 150 Idaho at 600-01. 
"In evaluating the instructions, we do not engage in a technical parsing of [the] language of the 
. instructions, but instead approach the instructions in the same way that the jury would - with a 
commonsense understanding of the instructions in the light of all that has taken place at the 
trial." Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350,367 (1993) (quotes and citation omitted). 
1. Felony-Murder With Specific Intent Aggravator 
Dunlap's claim is based upon the trial court not advising the jury that his guilty plea 
alone was insufficient to establish the felony-murder with specific intent aggravator, particularly 
since the Information used the phrase, "willfully, unlawfully and with malice aforethought" and 
the court did not define "specific intent." (Brief, pp.12-15.) 
In the first instruction, the jury was advised Dunlap had pled guilty to first-degree murder 
and was read the relevant portion of the Information as follows: 
That the defendant, Timothy Alan Dunlap, on or about the 16th day of 
October, 1991, in the County of Caribou, State ofIdaho, did willfully, unlawfully 
and with malice aforethought, kill Tonya Crane, a human being, by shooting her 
in the abdomen/stomach area of her body with a shotgun from which she died, 
which murder was committed in the perpetration of a robbery. 
(#32773 R.Supp.VoU, p.3.) Instruction nine discussed the three statutory aggravating factors 
alleged by the state, including felony-murder with specific intent, which read as follows, "(2) 
The murder was committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, arson, rape, robbery, 
burglary, kidnapping or mayhem and the defendant had the specific intent to cause the death of a 
human being." (Id., p.13.) 
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Dunlap's claim fails ~'s first prong because he has not established a constitutional 
violation. The proper question is not the definition of "willfully, unlawfully and with malice 
. aforethought," none of which are in the felony-murder aggravator, but whether Dunlap "had the 
specific intent to cause the death of a human being" when he murdered Tonya during the 
robbery. The phrase, "specific intent to cause the death of a human being," does not need further 
defining. See State v. Mayer, 139 Idaho 643, 647-48, 84 P.3d 579 (Ct. App. 2004) (citing Waits 
. v. People, 724 P.2d 1329, 1334-35 (Colo. 1986) (not required to define terms "intent," "specific 
intent," and "theft" for crime of burglary)). Simply stated, "specific intent" means did Dunlap 
intend to kill Tonya when he shot her during the robbery. Moreover, the jury was implicitly 
advised not to consider the plea when instructed, "you have been summoned before this court for 
a sentencing hearing regarding that offense. Evidence regarding the first-degree murder of 
Tonya Crane will be presented during this sentencing hearing. You may only consider evidence 
presented in this sentencing hearing." (#32773 R.Supp.Vol.I, p.3) (emphasis added). The 
Information underlying Dunlap's guilty plea was not evidence presented at the resentencing, but 
merely an explanation of prior proceedings. 
Dunlap has also failed to establish the second Perry prong because there is no clear law 
that instruction nine was improper, much less that it violates the Constitution. Therefore, there 
was no clearly established basis to object. Neither has Dunlap established harmlessness. Based 
upon the evidence from the sentencing hearing establishing Dunlap's intent at the time he robbed 
and shot Tonya, particularly his confessions that he shot her because "she did not give him all of 
the money" (#32773 Tr.Vol.V, p.121) and wanted "to teach her a lesson" because he was angry 
she allegedly failed to give him all the money (id., Vol.VIII, p.12), he has failed to establish his 
sentence would have been different if the instructions regarding the aggravator had been 
12 
modified. The evidence regarding the aggravators was so compelling that during closing 
argument Dunlap's attorney conceded, "The aggravating factors that the State has appropriately 
argued, you are going to find one or all of them." (Id., VoI.XI, p.57.) Finally, because the jury 
found two other aggravators and weighed the collective mitigation against them individually, any 
alleged error was harmless. See State v. Wood, 132 Idaho 88,105-06,967 P.2d 702 (1998). 
2. Failing To Define "Sufficiently Compelling" 
Instruction 14 discussed the weighing the jury was required to complete: 
If you find that all mitigating circumstances are sufficiently compelling to 
make imposition of the death penalty unjust, or you cannot unanimously agree on 
that issue, then the defendant will be sentenced to life in prison without the 
possibility of parole. 
If you find that all mitigating circumstances do not make the imposition of 
the death penalty unjust, then the defendant will be sentenced to death. 
(#32773 R.Supp.VoU, p.20.) 
Dunlap contends the court erred by failing to define "sufficiently compelling" because 
Idaho law allegedly prohibits imposition of the death penalty "if mitigation outweighs each 
individual aggravator by any degree." (Brief, pp.15-16) (emphasis omitted). The question is not 
whether the mitigation was "sufficiently compelling," but whether the mitigation made 
imposition of the death penalty "unjust." In other words, the mitigation was "sufficiently 
compelling" if it made "imposition of the death penalty unjust." Moreover, the phrase contains 
ordinary words which do not require further definition. See State v. Caldwell, 140 Idaho 740, 
741, 101 P.3d 233 (Ct. App. 2004) ("Ordinary words used in the sense in which they are 
generally understood need not be defined in jury instructions"); State v. Eytchison, 136 Idaho 
210,217,30 P.3d 988 (Ct. App. 2001) ("caution and restraint should be exercised in providing 
definitional instructions beyond those expressed by statutory declaration"). As explained in 
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Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 179 (2006), "Weighing is not an end; it is merely a means to 
reaching a decision. The decision the jury must reach is whether life or death is the appropriate 
punishment." Because the jury was able to make that determination without further defining 
"sufficiently compelling," Dunlap's claim fails the first Perry prong. 
Neither has Dunlap established the second prong because there is no applicable legal 
authority establishing further definition of the weighing instruction was mandated such that the 
district court or counsel would have known to provide the jury with further clarification or that 
the failure to provide such instruction violated the Constitution. Moreover, based upon the 
evidence from the sentencing hearing regarding mitigation and the extraordinary strength of the 
aggravation evidence, Dunlap has failed to establish ~'s third prong because the mitigation 
was neither "compelling," "sufficiently compelling," nor made the death penalty unjust. 
3. Independent Evidence For Each Statutory Aggravator 
In State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405,418-19,631 P.2d 187 (1981), this Court recognized 
identical evidence might be used to establish multiple statutory aggravators and, because the 
Court presumed the legislature did not intend to "duplicate enumerated circumstances," 
concluded when multiple aggravators are found they must be supported by additional evidence. 
See also Wood, 132 Idaho at 104 ("the sentencing judge may consider the same evidence he 
considered in relation to a different aggravator so long as he finds additional aggravating 
evidence to support a finding of that particular aggravator"). Dunlap contends the district court 
erred by failing to instruct the jury in accordance with Osborn and Wood. (Brief, p.16.) 
This Court's holding in Osborn was not based upon the Constitution, but statutory 
construction because the Supreme Court has not concluded double counting violates the 
Constitution. As explained in Jones v. U.S., 527 U.S. 373, 398 (1999): 
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We have never before held that aggravating factors could be duplicative so 
as to render them constitutionally invalid, nor have we passed on the "double 
counting" theory that the Tenth Circuit advanced in McCullah and the Fifth 
Circuit appears to have followed here. What we have said is that the weighing 
process may be impermissibly skewed if the sentencing jury considers an invalid 
factor. 
See also Rhoades v. Henry, 611 F.3d 1133, 1143 (9th Cir. 2010) (declining to address the issue of 
"double counting" in habeas "because it is a state law question"). 
Because Dunlap's "double counting" claim does not raise a constitutional question, it 
fails the first Perry prong. Neither has Dunlap established Perry's second prong because there is 
no applicable legal authority constitutionally mandating the district court instruct the jury in 
accordance with Osborn and Wood. Dunlap's claim also fails Perry's third prong because the 
jury was instructed to weigh the collective mitigation against each statutory aggravator 
individually. Because the state proved three statutory aggravating factors, even if the jury double 
counted evidence to support the aggravators, "it would have no effect on the ultimate imposition 
of the death penalty." State v. Sivak, 127 Idaho 387, 392, 901 P.2d 494 (1995). 
4. Utter Disregard 
The "utter disregard" aggravator is described in I.C. § 19-2515(9)(f) as follows: "The 
murder, or circumstances surrounding its commission, the defendant exhibited utter disregard for 
human life." The aggravator was limited in Osborn, 102 Idaho at 419, "to be reDective of acts or 
circumstances surrounding the crime which exhibit the highest, the utmost, callous disregard for 
human life, i.e., the cold-blooded, pitiless slayer." Despite recognizing the Supreme Court 
reasoned the language from Osborn is constitutional, Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463, 470-01 
(1993), Dunlap contends the instruction "fails to provide the specific and detailed guidance 
necessary to channel the jury's discretion and allow for a rational review of their finding of this 
aggravator." (Brief, pp.18-19.) 
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Instruction 10 reads as follows: 
The phrase "exhibited utter disregard for human life," with regard to the 
murder or the circumstances surrounding its commission, refers to acts or 
circumstances surrounding the crime that exhibit the highest, the utmost, callous 
disregard for human life, i.e., the cold-blooded, pitiless slayer. "Cold-blooded" 
means marked by absence of warm feeling; without consideration, compunction, 
or clemency, matter of fact or emotionless. "Pitiless" means devoid of or 
unmoved by mercy or compassion. A "cold-blooded, pitiless slayer" refers to a 
slayer who kills without feeling or sympathy. The utter disregard factor refers to 
the defendant's lack of conscience regarding killing another human being. 
(#32773 R.Supp.VoU, p.16.) Not only did instruction 10 recite the language from Osborn, it 
went further and provided additional guidance to the jury, which came from the Supreme Court: 
[T]he phrase "cold-blooded, pitiless slayer" is not without content. 
Webster's Dictionary defines "pitiless" to mean devoid of, or unmoved by, mercy 
or compassion. The lead entry for "cold blooded" gives coordinate definitions. 
One, "marked by absence of warm feelings: without consideration, compunction, 
or clemency," mirrors the definition of "pitiless." The other defines "cold-
blooded" to mean "matter of fact, emotionless." ... 
In ordinary usage, then, the phrase "cold-blooded, pitiless slayer" refers to 
a killer who kills without feeling or sympathy. 
Creech, 507 U.S. at 472 (citations omitted). 
It is incomprehensible that Dunlap has established a constitutional violation under Perry's 
first prong when the language from the instruction was based upon Osborn, which was expressly 
approved by the Supreme Court, and the additional language in the instruction was suggested by 
the Supreme Court in Creech. Neither has Dunlap established the second prong because, based 
upon the Supreme Court's decision in Creech, there was no basis for counselor the district court 
to further define the utter disregard aggravator. Therefore, the error could not have plainly 
existed as required under Perry, 245 P.3d at 980. Moreover, because the jury found two other 
aggravators and weighed the collective mitigation against those aggravators individually, any 
alleged error was harmless under Perry's third prong. See Wood, 132 Idaho at 105-06. 
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5. Absence Of Written Findings 
Prior to Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), the death penalty was imposed by a judge 
who made written findings. I.C. §19-2515 (2000). Based upon amendments to I.C. §19-2515, 
. the jury is now merely required to check the appropriate spaces on the special verdict form; 
written findings are not required. I.C. §19-2515 (2003). Dunlap contends the absence of written 
findings renders Idaho's sentencing scheme "unconstitutional for failing to provide a mechanism 
to protect [his] constitutional and I.C. § 19-2827 rights to pursue meaningful appellate review, as 
well as his right to jury trial." (Brief, pp.l 7-18.) The entirety of Dunlap's argument is premised 
upon the old statute and this Court's interpretation of that statute in Osborn, 102 Idaho at 414-15. 
Therefore, Dunlap cannot meet Perry's first prong because his claim is not premised upon the 
Constitution; nor could it be because in Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 750 (1990), the 
Court explained, "Nor are we impressed with the claim that without written jury findings 
concerning mitigating circumstances, appellate courts cannot perform their proper role." The 
Court concluded, "An appellate court also is able adequately to evaluate any evidence relating to 
mitigating factors without the assistance of written jury findings." Id. Based upon Clemons, 
neither can Dunlap meet Perrv's second prong because the error could not have plainly existed. 
Just like a finding of guilt in any trial, this Court has the opportunity to review the verdicts and 
conduct appellate review. Moreover, any alleged error was harmless. 
IV. 
Dunlap's Claim Regarding The Jury's Knowledge Of His Prior Death Sentence 
Was Not Preserved For Appeal 
A. Introduction And Relevant Facts 
Dunlap contends the jurors' knowledge he had been previously sentenced to death 
violates the Eighth Amendment because it diminished the jury's responsibility in imposing the 
death penalty. (Brief, pp.19-21.) Dunlap's complaint stems from Dr. Mark Cunningham's 
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testimony in Dunlap's prior post-conviction case, which was read to the jury at the resentencing, 
. referencing Dunlap was on "death row." (#32773 Tr.Vo1.IX, p.127.) This issue fails because 
Dunlap did not object and he has failed to demonstrate fundamental error. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"When considering alleged violations of constitutional rights, this Court defers to the 
district court's findings of fact unless clearly erroneous, but exercises free review over the trial 
court's determination as to whether constitutional requirements have been satisfied in light of the 
facts found." State v. Thorngren, 149 Idaho 729, 735,240 P.3d 575 (2010) (quotes, citation, and 
brackets omitted). 
C. Dunlap Has Failed To Establish Fundamental Error 
Dunlap's claim fails Perry's first prong because even if the jury knew he was previously 
sentenced to death in this or any other case, he has failed to establish a constitutional violation. 
In Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1,9-13 (1994), the Supreme Court concluded there was no 
constitutional error advising the jury the defendant had been sentenced to death in another case. 
In State v. Gales, 443 N. W.2d 124, 156 (Neb. 2005), the court determined when the prior death 
sentence stemmed from the same case, i.e., a resentencing, Romano's reasoning "is equally 
applicable." See also King v. Mississippi, 960 So.2d 413, 434 (Miss. 2007); State v. Jaynes, 549 
S.E.2d 179, 190 (N.C. 2001); State v. Simonsen, 986 P.2d 566, 570 (Or. 1999); Muniz v. 
Johnson, 132 F.3d 214, 223 (5 th Cir. 1998). As explained in Romano, 512 U.S. at 8 (quotes and 
citation omitted), Dunlap's reliance upon Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 340 (1985) 
(Brief, p.19), is misplaced because Caldwell was based upon comments in the prosecutor's 
closing argument, "which were quite focused, unambiguous and strong, [that] misled the jury to 
believe that the responsibility for sentencing the defendant lay elsewhere;" those comments did 
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not refer to either a prior death sentence, but to appellate review, Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 325-26. 
The Court concluded, "To establish a Caldwell violation, a defendant must show that the remarks 
to the jury improperly described the role assigned to the jury by local law." Romano, 512 U.S. at 
9 (quotes, brackets, and citation omitted). The "infirmity identified in Caldwell [was] simply 
absent" in Dunlap's case because "the jury was not affirmatively misled regarding its role in the 
sentencing process. The evidence at issue was neither false at the time it was admitted, nor did it 
even pertain to the jury's role in the sentencing process." Id. The other cases relied upon by 
Dunlap are also inapposite because they were decided before Romano, and they are based upon 
the jury learning the defendant had been previously convicted of the same offense, not a prior 
death sentence. Moreover, Leonard v. U.S., 378 U.S. 544 (1964) (Brief, p.20), was "limited ... 
to its facts." Moore v. Parker, 425 F.3d 250,256 (6th Cir. 2005). 
Neither has Dunlap established Perry's second prong because, based upon Romano and 
the instructions given to the jury, there was simply no basis for counselor the district court to 
believe knowledge of the prior sentence would diminish the jury's sense of responsibility. More 
importantly, counsel undoubtedly had a tactical reason for deciding not to object. 
Finally, whether relevant to the second or third Perry prong, based upon the evidence that 
had to be presented by the state regarding Dunlap's malingering and his miraculous mental 
health recovery when he learned he had to be resentenced, it was unavoidable the jury was going 
to learn of the prior sentence. Dr. Craig Beaver was questioned regarding portions of Dunlap's 
medical file and notes written by a prison psychologist, Dr. Chad Sombke, which stated: 
He appeared clear and appropriate. He was asking to be let out of ad seg because 
his death sentence was overturned. I asked him about his previous delusional beliefs 
about area 51 and the government having a microphone, etc. in his cell spying on him. 
He smiled and said that he made it all up in order to get people to believe that he was 
mentally ill. He continued to say that his past behavior was all purposeful and due to him 
being on death row .... 
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* * * * 
Since his death sentence, his, something, dropped. He has changed dramatically. 
He has not acted inappropriately or made verbal threats since. He has stopped taking his 
meds but he is not decompensating in any manner. He is lucid with goal-oriented 
thoughts. We will continue to monitor or either CI or C-l. ... 
(#32773 Tr.Vol.XI, p.98.) 
Because Dunlap has failed to establish all three Perry prongs, his claim fails. 
V. 
Dunlap's Claim Regarding Sequestering The Jury Was Not Preserved For Appeal 
A. Introduction And Relevant Facts 
Based upon I.C. §19-2126, Dunlap contends he was denied his Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights because the jury was not sequestered throughout the resentencing hearing. 
(Brief, pp.21-22.) Because Dunlap did not object and has failed to demonstrate fundamental 
error, this issue fails on appeal. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"The decision whether or not to sequester a jury ... is committed to the sound discretion 
of the trial judge." State v. Hall, 111 Idaho 827, 831, 727 P.2d 1255 (Ct. App.1986). 
C. Dunlap Has Failed To Establish Fundamental Error 
Idaho Code §19-2126 reads as follows: 
The jury sworn to try any felony may, at any time during the trial, and 
after the submission of the cause, in the discretion of the court, be permitted to 
separate, or they may be kept together, in the charge of a proper officer. Provided 
however, that in causes where the defendant has been charged with first-degree 
murder, the jury may not be permitted to separate after submission of the cause 
and completion of the special sentencing proceeding held pursuant to section 19-
2516 or 19-2515, Idaho Code. 
Dunlap did not object to the jury not being sequestered during the entirety of the 
resentencing. (#32773 Tr. YoU, pp.65-68; Vol. XI, p.185.) Because an objection for failing to 
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properly sequester the jury is required to preserve the issue for appeal, State v. Flint, 114 Idaho 
806,810,761 P.2d 1158 (1988), Dunlap must establish fundamental error under Perry. 
Dunlap's claim fails under Perry's first prong because it is based upon a statute. See 
State v. Rollins, 2011 WL 2803621, *7 (Idaho Ct. App. 2011) ("Where the asserted error relates 
to a violation of a rule or statute, instead of an infringement upon a constitutional right, the 
fundamental error doctrine may not be invoked"). Dunlap's claim also fails because, 
"'[A]lthough there is a constitutional right to a fair trial, there is no absolute right to have one's 
jury sequestered in a criminal case, capital or otherwise.'" Thompson v. Miller, 2010 WL 
3023494, *5 (W.D. Okla. 2010) (quoting Matthews v. Simpson, 603 F.Supp.2d 960, 1067-68 
(W.D. Ky. 2009)); see also Pineda v. Miller, 2006 WL 2239105, *18 (E.D.N.Y 2006) ("no court 
has ruled that the sequestration of a jury is a 'fundamental or constitutionally guaranteed right'''). 
Because the alleged error does not plainly exist, Dunlap's claim also fails under Perry's 
second prong. First, Dunlap's reading of the statute is not clearly established, particularly since 
the jury was empanelled only for resentencing. In such a case, "after submission of the cause" 
could refer to submission at the close of evidence from the resentencing. To the extent it means 
after completion of the guilt-phase portion of a capital trial, the statute would have no application 
since there was no jury empanelled for the guilt-phase. Second, irrespective of I.C. §19-2126, 
counsel may have had tactical reasons for not wanting the jury sequestered during all of the 
resentencing hearing. Based upon the ambiguities regarding I.C. § 19-2126 in cases involving 
only resentencing, arty error cannot be plain under Perry's second prong. 
Any error was harmless under Perry's third prong. While a juror had two conversations 
with a witness, the juror was excused prior to the presentation of any evidence. (#32773 
Tr.Vol.V, pp.13-21.) Moreover, Dunlap's claim regarding someone allegedly overhearing a 
21 
juror talking on a cell phone is based upon hearsay, speculation, and conjecture, and Dunlap's 
attorney expressly waived further investigation into the matter. (Id., Vol.XII, pp.88-90.) See 
State v. Rodriguez, 93 Idaho 286, 290,460 P.2d 711 (1969) (applying harmless error when juror 
was joined at lunch by state's witness and conversation did not relate to the trial). 
VI. 
Dunlap Has Failed To Establish The District Court Unconstitutionally Abused Its Discretion By 
Denying His Request To Have A Second Expert Present Live Testimony At The Resentencing 
A. Introduction And Relevant Facts 
Dunlap filed a motion for the appointment of Dr. Cunningham, who testified in Dunlap's 
first post-conviction hearing (#32773 R., pp.252-54), and a motion for the appointment of Dr. 
Craig Beaver, who was also familiar with Dunlap's case, to "properly evaluate and determine not 
only the psychiatric and psychological background of Mr. Dunlap, but the neuropsychological 
aspects of the case as well" (id., pp.260-62). The district court appointed Dr. Beaver (id., 
pp.346-48), but explained Dunlap would be appointed only one mental health expert (id., pp.435-
37). Dunlap filed a motion requesting that, while the defense would like Dr. Cunningham to 
testify, at a minimum his testimony from the first post-conviction hearing be read to the jury (id., 
pp.501-03), which was permitted pursuant to stipulation (#32773 Tr. 1-10-06, pp.12-15). Later, 
the court rejected Dr. Cunningham's subsequent affidavit (#32773 R., pp.615-27), explaining: 
You have one expert. The Supreme Court says that that is all that should 
be paid for by the State. I think the only reason that Dr. Cunningham's testimony 
is going to be given in this case through deposition is because counsel for the 
State stipulated with defense counsel that Dr. O'Bray's testimony can be given by 
deposition and Dr. Cunningham's. And other than that, I would probably not 
even allow the testimony by deposition of Dr. Cunningham. 
(#32773 Tr. Vol.V, p.10.) 
Dunlap contends the district court abused its discretion by denying his request to have Dr. 
Cunningham testify live. Assuming Dunlap properly preserved this claim, because the district 
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court's decision is consistent with Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985), Dunlap has failed to 
establish the court abused its discretion.5 Because of Dr. Beaver's testimony and the reading of 
. Dr. Cunningham'S testimony, any alleged error was harmless. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"This Court reviews the decision of a trial court to appoint or not appoint an expert to 
assist the defendant through an abuse of discretion standard." State v. Jones, 127 Idaho 478, 
481, 903 P .2d 67 (1995). 
C. The District Court Properly Exercised Its Discretion 
In Ake, 470 U.S. at 83, the Supreme Court reasoned, "[W]hen a defendant demonstrates 
to the trial judge that his sanity at the time of the offense is to be a significant factor at trial, the 
State must, at a minimum, assure the defendant access to a competent psychiatrist who will 
conduct an appropriate examination and assist in evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the 
defense." In State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 65, 90 P.3d 278 (2003), this Court addressed the 
parameters of appointing experts: 
The [C]onstitution does not require a state to provide expert or 
investigative assistance merely because a defendant requests it. A defendant's 
request for expert or investigative services should be reviewed in light of all 
circumstances and be measured against the standard of "fundamental fairness" 
embodied in the due process clause. Before authorizing the expenditure of public 
funds for a particular purpose in an indigent's defense, the trial court must 
determine whether the funds are necessary in the interest of justice. 
Addressing the state's interest in being required to provide psychiatric assistance, the 
Supreme Court explained it would not be a "staggering burden" because "the obligation of the 
State is limited to provision of one competent psychiatrist." Ake, 470 U.S. at 78-79. Relying 
5 Dunlap's "compulsory protection" claim fails because it is not supported with argument and 
authority. Pizzuto v. State, 146 Idaho 720, 725,202 P.3d 642 (2008). 
23 
upon the "unambiguous language" of Ake, in Leavitt v. Arave, 646 F.3d 605,610 (9th Cir. 2011) 
(quotes, omissions, emphasis, and citations omitted), the Ninth Circuit has recently reaffirmed: 
[T]he defendant lacks the right to appointment of a second psychiatrist even 
where the first psychiatrist is alleged to be incompetent or reaches a diagnosis 
unfavorable to the defense. We've recognized that Ake's limitation to a single, 
independent psychiatrist is critical given that psychiatry is not an exact science, 
and psychiatrists disagree widely and frequently on the appropriate diagnosis. 
Accordingly, neither we, nor the Supreme Court has ever held that a trial court 
violated Ake by refusing to appoint a second, let alone third, mental health expert. 
Based upon the district court's appointment of Dr. Beaver, not only has Dunlap failed to 
establish the district court abused its discretion, but he received a windfall when, pursuant to the 
parties' stipulation, Dr. Cunningham's prior post-conviction testimony was read to the jury. 
Additionally, based upon Dunlap's failure to explain how he was prejudiced by having Dr. 
Cunningham's testimony being read to the jury in conjunction with Dr. Beaver's testimony 
regarding future dangerousness (#32773 Tr.Vol.XI, pp.48-50), any error associated with the 
court denying Dunlap's request for live testimony was harmless. See Chaney v. Stewart, 156 
F.3d 921, 924 (9th Cir. 1998); Angel v. Commonwealth, 704 S.E.2d 386,395-96 (Va. 2011). 
VII. 
Dunlap Has Failed To Support His Claim Regarding The District Court's "Active Role In The 
Finances" With Any Authority 
Dunlap contends he was denied due process and equal protection based upon the district 
court's alleged "preoccupation with money" and that the court should not have "overseen" the 
resentencing and "made funding decisions that impacted the sentencing." (Brief, pp.25-26.) 
Because Dunlap has failed to cite any authority in support of this claim, this Court should not 
address the claim's merits. Pizzuto, 146 Idaho at 725. Presumably, Dunlap failed to cite any 
authority because this Court has rejected the notion that a "money judge" is constitutionally 
mandated to manage the finances associated with a capital case. Wood, 132 Idaho at 100. 
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Further, because this issue was not raised below, Dunlap must establish fundamental error, which 
he has not even attempted based upon his failure to provide authority establishing a 
constitutional violation based upon the manner in which the court dealt with financial concerns. 
VIII. 
Dunlap's Claims Regarding His Absence At Two Chamber Conferences And Not Having Them 
Recorded Were Not Preserved For Appeal 
A. Introduction And Relevant Facts 
Dunlap's claim that he was denied due process and meaningful appellate review is based 
upon two chamber conferences he contends were not recorded and at which he was not present. 
(Brief, pp.27-28.) Because Dunlap failed to object to not being present or having the entirety of 
the two conferences recorded and has failed to demonstrate fundamental error, these issues fail. 
The first incident involved a note from a juror received by the court during evidence presentation 
requesting instruction regarding aggravating factors. (#32773 R., p.653.) Court minutes reflect 
counsel was advised and agreed the jury would be properly instructed regarding aggravating 
factors when evidence presentation was completed. (Id.) The second incident involved a note 
from courtroom observer, Vicky Dahms, who allegedly saw a juror talking on a cell phone, 
stating, "the state wants us to believe." (#32773 Tr.Vol.XII, p.88.) The court and counsel for 
both parties spoke with Dahms in chambers without Dunlap or the conversation being recorded 
(#32773 R., p.696), after which the parties reported for the record what took place and how they 
wished to proceed (#32773 Tr.Vol.XII, pp.88-90). Dunlap's attorney expressly waived further 
questioning of the juror (id., pp.89-90), and no objection was made regarding the failure to 
record the conversation with Dahms or Dunlap's absence. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of review for constitutional violations is articulated above in section IV(B). 
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C. Dunlap Has Failed To Establish Fundamental Error 
"The Supreme Court has never held that due process requires a verbatim transcript of the 
entire proceedings. To the contrary, it has specifically held that states may find 'other means of 
affording adequate and effective appellate review' of criminal convictions." Karabin v. Petsock, 
758 F.2d 966, 969 (3rd Cir. 1985) (quoting Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 20 (1956». In 
Karabin, the court distinguished Hardy v. U.S., 375 U.S. 277, 280 (1964), recognizing there was 
a "complete absence of any transcript" and Hardy was "based on federal statutory, not 
constitutional grounds." Id., 758 F.2d at 969. When "the information available is sufficient for 
the parties to argue the issues upon appellate review and for [the appellate] court to make 
informed decisions," there is no due process violation. Kien v. State, 782 N.E.2d 398, 406 (Ct. 
App. Ind. 2003). Admittedly, I. C. § 1-1103 requires the court reporter to "correctly report all oral 
proceedings had in said court and the testimony taken in all cases tried before said court." 
However, as explained in Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 65 (emphasis in original), merely because 
"unrecorded proceedings probably dealt with appealable issues" does not establish a 
constitutional violation. See also State v. Wright, 97 Idaho 229, 331-33, 542 P.2d 63 (1975); 
State v. Polson, 92 Idaho 615, 620-21, 448 P.2d 229 (1968). Therefore, because there is no 
constitutional right to a verbatim transcript of the proceedings, Dunlap cannot establish the first 
or second Perry prongs. Any error regarding the first conference was also harmless since the 
jury was properly instructed regarding aggravating factors at the conclusion of the hearing. 
Based upon the record made after the conference involving Dahms' note, it is difficult to imagine 
how Dunlap has failed to establish failing to record the conferences affected the outcome. 
In Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 562, 149 P.3d 833 (2006) (quotes and citations 
omitted), this Court discussed what constitutes a "critical stage," explaining, "[i]n determining 
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whether a particular stage is 'critical,' it is necessary to analyze whether potential substantial 
prejudice to defendant's rights inheres in the particular confrontation and the ability of counsel to 
help avoid that prejudice." In Wood, 132 Idaho at 108 (quotes and citation omitted), this Court 
addressed a defendant's absence during chamber conferences, recognizing, "A defendant has the 
right to be present at all stages of a criminal proceeding if absence could, under some set of 
circumstances, be harmful." Because the conference regarding plea negotiations was not 
harmful, this Court concluded there was no constitutional violation. Id. The same was true in 
Payne, 146 Idaho at 578, which involved a chamber meeting regarding the procedure for 
examining the defendant by the state's experts. Because the district court did not enter the order 
until after addressing the defendant on the record, there was no prejudice. While there is a 
constitutional right to be present at all critical proceedings, Dunlap has failed to establish either 
of these two conferences constitute critical proceedings resulting in the denial of a constitutional 
right, which means not only has he failed to establish Perry's first prong, he has also failed to 
establish the second prong since the alleged error was not plain. Finally, as in Wood and Payne, 
any alleged error was harmless as a result of him not being present at the two respective 
conferences, particularly since no decision was rendered that affected his substantial rights. 
IX. 
Dunlap's Claim Regarding Faiiing To Inquire Into Alleged Juror Misconduct Vias 
Preserved For Appeal 
Attempting to salvage his claim regarding the note given to the district court during jury 
deliberations from Dahms (see section VIII), Dunlap contends the district court "should have 
interviewed the juror and conducted an inquiry to determine the scope and depth of the contact." 
. (Brief, p.37.) Dunlap's claim fails on several fronts. First, not only did Dunlap fail to object to 
questioning the juror, which requires he establish fundamental error, see State v. Adams, 147 
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Idaho 857, 860-62, 216 P.2d 146 (Ct. App. 2009), his attorney waived questioning of the juror 
(#32773 Tr. Vol. XII, pp.89-90). Therefore, any error is invited and cannot be reviewed on 
appeal. "The doctrine of invited error applies to estop a party from asserting an error when his or 
, her own conduct induces the commission of the error. One may not complain of errors one has 
consented to or acquiesced in." State v. Norton, --- Idaho ---, 254 P.3d 77,88 (Ct. App. 2011). 
Second, because Dunlap has failed to cite any authority supporting his contention the 
district court must, over the objection of defense counsel, conduct further inquiry regarding juror 
misconduct, this Court should not review this issue on appeal. See Pizzuto, 146 Idaho at 725. 
Finally, to the extent the district court was required to inquire into the incident, that inquiry was 
completed by questioning Dahms. As a result, Dunlap's attorney stated, "It does sound like it 
may have been, and probably was an innocent comment to a spouse and more a matter of 
understanding what the circumstances were timewise." (#32773 Tr.VoI.XII, p.89.) As in U.S. v. 
Gianakos, 415 F.3d 912, 922 (8th Cir. 2005), the parties and the district court were in the best 
position to determine whether further inquiry was mandated. See also State v. Stuart, 967 A.2d 
532,542 (Conn. Ct. App. 2009) ("the court did not abuse its discretion in deciding that no further 
inquiry was necessary"). Dunlap's case is analogous to State v. Nelson, 131 Idaho 210, 219, 953 
P.2d 650 (Ct. App. 1998), where a note was found by a juror under another juror's seat stating, 
"not guilty." The court of appeals concluded, "There is no basis to infer that this juror or any 
other was influenced to the slightest degree by the scrap of paper." Id. 
Dunlap's reliance upon Remmer v. U.S., 347 U.S. 227, 229 (1954), is unavailing. As 
recognized by several courts, the Supreme Court has modified Remmer, and even courts that 
have not recognized the modification acknowledge there is tension between Remmer and 
subsequent Supreme Court decisions. As explained in Crease v. McKune, 189 F.3d 1188, 1193 
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(1oth Cir. 1999), "We view the Remmer presumption as a rule of federal criminal procedure, 
"rather than a rule of federal constitutional law." In Tracey v. Palmateer, 341 F.3d 1037, 1039-44 
(9 th Cir. 2003) (quotes, citations, brackets and emphasis omitted), the court explained, "[O]ur 
own cases have interpreted Smith and Remmer as providing a flexible rule .... an evidentiary 
hearing is not mandated every time there is an allegation of jury misconduct or bias. Rather, in 
"determining whether a hearing must be held, the court must consider the content of the 
allegations, the seriousness ofthe alleged misconduct or bias, and the credibility of the source." 
Considering the content of the allegation from Dahms and the nature of the alleged 
misconduct, Dunlap has failed to establish a constitutional violation based upon the court's 
acquiescence to not questioning the juror. Dunlap has failed to meet any of the Perry prongs. 
X. 
Dunlap's Claims Of Prose cut oria I Misconduct Were Not Preserved For Appeal 
A. Introduction And Relevant Facts 
Dunlap contends the prosecutors committed misconduct during voir dire, misstating the 
law in the opening statement, and four incidences of misconduct in closing argument. (Brief, 
pp.28-36.) Because Dunlap did not object to the voir dire, opening statement, or closing 
arguments and has not demonstrated fundamental error, each claim fails. Dunlap also contends 
the state's expert, Dr. Daryl Matthews, improperly bolstered his testimony and vouched for 
reports of "non-testifying witnesses," which "invaded the province of the jury." (Brief, pp.33-
34.) How this constitutes prosecutorial misconduct is a mystery. Therefore, the state will 
address the claim as it pertains to whether Dr. Matthews' testimony violated the Constitution. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"On appeal, the standard of review govemmg claims of prosecutorial misconduct 
depends on whether the defendant objected to the misconduct at trial. As a general rule, we will 
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not consider arguments made for the first time on appeal. ... Accordingly, when an objection to 
prosecutorial misconduct is not raised at trial, the misconduct will serve as a basis for setting 
aside a conviction only when the conduct is sufficiently egregious to result in fundamental 
error." State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 715-16, 215 P.3d 414 (2009). Perry's fundamental 
error standard is detailed in section I(C) above. 
C. General Standards Of Law Regarding Voir Dire, Opening Statements, Closing 
Arguments, And Prosecutorial Misconduct 
"It has been long established in Idaho that wide latitude is allowed counsel in the 
examination of potential jurors on voir dire to afford counsel information which might enable the 
attorney to more intelligently exercise challenges, either for cause or peremptorily." State v. 
Camarillo, 106 Idaho 310, 312, 678 P.2d 102 eCt. App. 1984); see also State v. Pontier, 95 Idaho 
707, 710, 518 P.2d 969 (1974). The function of opening statements is detailed in State v. 
Griffith, 97 Idaho 52, 56, 539 P.2d 604 (1975): 
Opening statements serve to inform the jury of the issues of the case and briefly 
outline the evidence each litigant intends to introduce to support his allegations or 
defenses, as the case may be. While counsel should be allowed latitude in making 
an opening statement, the trial court may limit the scope of that statement in the 
exercise of its discretion. Generally, opening remarks should be confined to a 
brief summary of evidence counsel expects to introduce on behalf of his client's 
case-in-chief. Counsel should not at that time attempt to impeach or otherwise 
argue the merits of evidence that the opposing side has or will present. 
Counsel also have "considerable latitude in presenting their closing arguments and have 
the right to discuss fully, from their respective standpoints, the evidence, inferences and 
deductions arising from the evidence." Payne, 199 P.3d at 141. However, closing arguments are 
not without limitation. As explained in State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 86, 156 P.3d 583 (Ct. 
App. 2007) (quotes and citations omitted): 
Closing argument should not include counsel's personal opmlOns and beliefs 
about the credibility of a witness or the guilt or innocence of the accused. Nor 
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should it include disparaging comments about opposing counsel, or inflammatory 
words employed in describing a witness or defendant. A closing argument may 
not misrepresent or mischaracterize the evidence, unduly emphasize irrelevant 
facts introduced at trial, refer to facts not in evidence, argue as substantive 
evidence matters admitted for limited evidentiary purposes, or misrepresent the 
law or the reasonable doubt burden. The credibility of a witness may not be 
bolstered or attacked by reference to religious beliefs, and appeals to racial or 
ethnic prejudices are prohibited. In a criminal case, a prosecutor may not directly 
or indirectly comment on a defendant's invocation of his constitutional right to 
remain silent, either at trial or before trial, for the purposes of inferring guilt. 
Lastly, and of particular importance to the present case, appeals to emotion, 
passion or prejudice of the jury through use of inflammatory tactics are 
impermissible. 
In State v. Sanchez, 142 Idaho 309, 318, 127 P.3d 212 (et. App. 2005) (citations 
omitted), the court of appeals discussed the parameters of prosecutorial misconduct: 
Prosecutorial misconduct may so infect the trial with unfairness as to 
make the resulting conviction a denial of due process. To constitute a due process 
violation, the prosecutorial misconduct must be of sufficient significance to result 
in the denial of the defendant's right to a fair trial. The touchstone of due process 
analysis in cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness of the trial, 
not the culpability of the prosecutor. The aim of due process is not the 
punishment of society for the misdeeds of the prosecutor but avoidance of an 
unfair trial to the accused. 
D. Dunlap Has Failed To Establish Fundamental Error 
1. Voir Dire 
During voir dire, the following colloquy regarding common sense and reasonable doubt 
took place between venireman Hunzeker and the prosecutor: 
And again, one of the things that we ask of jurors is to use your common sense 
and, like I said, that is one of the reasons why we do ask people in the community 
to come and do that. Obviously, we can't have lawyers on the jury. They take 
our common sense away from us the first day of law school. So I guess one of the 
things that I would like to ki10W is when you had prior big decisions in your life, 
have you kind of weighed the pros and cons and used your common sense to 
come up with a decision based on that? 
A. Usually I write them down. 
Q. Yeah. 
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A. Pros and cons. 
Q. And that's a good way to kind of weigh them as well. 
A. It is to me. 
Q. And that is true with any big decision, whether you are buying a 
house or taking a job or something like that, you kind of weigh the pros and cons 
and decide whether it is right. If you had a reasonable doubt about whether one of 
those decisions was right, would you have made it, made that decision. 
A. Could you say that again. 
Q. If you had a reasonable doubt, say you are going to buy a house, 
but you had a reasonable [sic] that just buying that house wasn't the right thing to 
do. Maybe it has termites, would you have made that decision? Would you have 
divided [sic] to do it anyway despite having a reasonable doubt? 
A. Probably not. 
Q. Okay, and that's the point that I am trying to make. That is all that 
we ask of jurors is to use their common sense and their life experiences. 
(#37270 Tr. 3-26-08, pp.II-12.) 
Dunlap contends the prosecutor misstated the reasonable doubt standard by "[ e ]quating 
the reaching of a life or death verdict with buying a house or obtaining employment." (Brief, 
p.29.) Dunlap has failed to establish any of the Perry fundamental error prongs. First, when read 
in context, the prosecutor was not defining reasonable doubt, but discussing concepts of common 
sense during deliberations. Second, counsel is not prevented from discussing the concept of 
reasonable doubt during voir dire. See Camarillo, 106 Idaho at 313. Third, the prosecutor's 
statement was not an incorrect statement. While decisions regarding marriage, housing, and 
employment may be "revocable" (Brief, p.29), they also constitute some of the "most important 
affairs" in an ordinary person's life and, as such, an instruction regarding the same would not 
reduce the state's burden of proof. See State v. Kuhn, 139 Idaho 710, 712-14, 85 P.3d 1109 (Ct. 
App. 2003). As explained in Anderson v. State, 278 A.2d 439, 449-48 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
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1971), owning property is a most important affair and can be used to explain the concept of 
reasonable doubt. This is in stark contrast to People v. Nguyen, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 840, 845 (Cal. 
App. 4th Dist. 1995), where the court concluded, "The prosecutor's argument that people apply a 
reasonable doubt standard 'every day' and that it is the same standard people customarily use in 
deciding whether to change lanes trivializes the reasonable doubt standard." As recognized in 
Cooper v. State, 2008 WL 4595180, *2 n.19 (Alaska Ct. App. 2008), jurisdictions criticizing 
"the use of examples such as making an investment or buying a house" have not reversed based 
upon misconduct. Finally, Dunlap has failed to establish how the reasonable doubt instruction 
(#32773 R.Supp.VoU, p.6) did not cure any alleged deficiency from the prosecutor's comments. 
2. Opening Statement 
Dunlap contends the prosecutor misstated the law regarding mitigation in his opening 
statement by stating, "No amount of evidence from Tim Dunlap's past can outweigh the callous 
disregard for human life when he killed Tonya Crane." (Brief, p.30.) Presumably, counsel did 
not object to this snippet because it does not misstate the law, particularly when placed in 
context. The sentence is taken from the final paragraph of the prosecutor's opening statement: 
Now, ladies and gentlemen, as I stand here before you, and with my co-
counsel Mr. Whatcott and Mr. Smith, one of the things we acknowledge in this 
case is that we are asking you to do a very hard thing. Weare asking you to 
impose the ultimate sanction for the neediess killing of a 24-year-old woman who 
had everything to live for. When you look at the underlying facts of the murders 
of Tonya Crane and Belinda Bolanos, you will be able to conclude that Timothy 
Alan Dunlap is a willing and predisposed killer, who kills with know [sic] 
provocation at all. No amount of evidence from Tim Dunlap's past can outweigh 
the callous disregard for human life when he killed T onya Crane. And when it 
comes right down to it, at the end of this case, ladies and gentlemen, after you 
have had a chance to examine all of the evidence, you [sic] we will come back 
before you and ask you to impose a sentence that reflects that reality. 
(#32773 Tr.Vol.V, pp.37-38.) 
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The prosecutor was not asking the jury to ignore or refuse to consider evidence in the 
weighing process, or ignore its responsibility to weigh the mitigation against each aggravator, 
. but explaining that, irrespective of the mitigation presented, it would not be sufficient to make 
imposition of the death penalty unjust in Dunlap's case. In fact, the prosecutor admonished the 
jury "to examine all of the evidence." (Id., p.38.) Dunlap failed to establish fundamental error. 
3. Closing Argument And The "Nexus" Allegation 
Dunlap contends the prosecutor committed misconduct by arguing there must be a nexus 
or causal connection between the mitigation evidence and Tonya's murder. (Brief, p.31.) The 
state acknowledges merely because there is not a "nexus to the crime," does not mean mitigation 
is not relevant and should not be considered by the jury. Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 287 
(2004); Payne, 146 Idaho at 569-70. However, "[h]aving considered all the evidence, the [jury] 
was not obliged to find it mitigating; [it] was free to assess how much weight to assign to such 
evidence." Pizzuto v. Arave, 280 F.3d 949, 972 (9th Cir. 2002) (emphasis in original) (quote and 
citation omitted». As explained in State v. Porter, 130 Idaho 772, 789, 948 P.2d 127 (1997), 
"the determination of whether a factor is mitigating or aggravating in a specific case is a factual 
one." Prosecutors have never been prevented from arguing juries should give less weight to 
mitigation unconnected to the murder. In State v. Anderson, 111 P.3d 369, 392 (Ariz. 2005), the 
prosecutor "emphasized during closing argument "that a psychologist called by the defense to 
offer mitigation evidence 'didn't testify about any links, any connections between the 
defendant's upbringing and him murdering people. Nothing in his childhood caused that. '" The 
court recognized the statements were not improper, explaining: 
While Eddings and various other Supreme Court decisions dictate a liberal 
rule of admissibility for mitigating evidence, they still leave it to the sentencer to 
determine the weight to be given to relevant mitigating evidence. Once the jury 
has heard all of the defendant's mitigation evidence, there is no constitutional 
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prohibition against the State arguing that the evidence is not particularly relevant 
or that it is entitled to little weight. The prosecutor's various comments and 
questions here simply went to the weight of Anderson's mitigation evidence and 
were not improper. 
Id. (quotes and citations omitted, emphasis in original); see also State v. Raines, 653 S.E.2d 126, 
139-40 (N.C. 2007); Sims v. Brown, 425 F.3d 560, 578-80 (9th Cir. 2005). 
Presumably, counsel did not object because the challenged statements were not 
impermissible, which means Dunlap has failed to establish the first and second Perry prongs. 
Moreover, any alleged error was harmless under Perry's third prong. 
4. Closing Argument And The "Utter Disregard" Aggravator 
Parsing out another phrase, Dunlap contends the prosecutor impermissibly "broadened" 
the "utter disregard" statutory aggravator by stating, "there is some language in that instruction 
that talks about the cold~blooded pitiless slayer, and that is given to you as an example of what 
utter disregard is." (Brief, pp.31-32) (emphasis omitted). Because the only reference to the 
meaning of "utter disregard" involved merely the language from the instruction, the prosecutor 
was not attempting to broaden the aggravator. The entirety of the statement reads as follows: 
So we look at the first aggravating factor in this case as being utter 
disregard for human life, and clearly that is utter disregard for the life of Tonya 
Crane. And this instruction talks about acts or circumstances committed by the 
defendant that exhibit the highest and utmost callous disregard for human life. 
And what this instruction is referring to, it is referring to Tim Dunlap's lack of 
conscience regarding the killing of Tonya Crane. 
Now there is some language in that instruction that talks about the cold-
blooded pitiless slayer, and that is given to you as an example of what utter 
disregard is. It talks about marked by absence of feeling, consideration, 
clemency, matter of fact, or emotionless. Says that pitiless means devoid of or 
unmoved by mercy or compassion. They are talking about a slayer who kills 
without feeling or sympathy. 
So in looking at this particular crime, what facts exhibit the defendant's 
utter disregard for the life of Tonya Crane? 
(#32773 Tr.Vol.XII, p.37.) 
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After discussing the facts exhibiting Dunlap's utter disregard, the prosecutor emphasized 
the phrase, "cold-blooded, pitiless slayer," stating: (1) "The instruction when it is talking about 
this cold-blooded, pitiless slayer, think of how he characterized his actions that day"; (2) "I ask 
you, ladies and gentlemen, is there really any better way to describe Tim Dunlap than a cold-
blooded, pitiless slayer"; and (3) "So is there really any other way, better way, to describe Tim 
Dunlap on that day than cold-blooded and pitiless." CId., pp.38-39.) Based upon the 
prosecutor's failure to use any "example" of "utter disregard" except the facts establishing 
Dunlap is a "cold-blooded, pitiless slayer," there is no doubt why counsel did not object: they did 
not want to make a trivial objection that would unduly emphasize the instruction and the 
prosecutor's discussion of how the state had proven the aggravator beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Finally, any alleged error was harmless because the jury found two other aggravators and 
weighed the collective mitigation against those aggravators individually. See Wood, 132 Idaho 
at 719-20; Hoffman v. Arave, 236 F.3d 523,541-42 (9th Cir. 2001). 
5. Closing Argument And Allegedly Misstating The Law 
Dunlap next contends the prosecutor misstated the law by stating, "And for his actions on 
that day, Idaho law requires that his life be taken as well," and "the main reason that Tim Dunlap 
deserves the death penalty in this case is because Idaho law requires it." (Brief, pp.32-33 
(quoting #32773 Tr.Vol.XII, pp.34, 51).) These snippets are not contrary to law, but proper 
argument asserting that, under Idaho law, the state met its burden of establishing at least one 
statutory aggravating factor and that the mitigation did not make imposition of the death penalty 
unjust. Counsel did not object because the statements are proper, which means Dunlap has failed 
to establish the first and second Perry prongs. Considering the overwhelming evidence and de 
minimus nature of the statement, any alleged error was also harmless under Perry. 
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6. Closing Argument And The "Threat To Society" 
Dunlap contends the prosecutor's discussion of the "propensity" aggravator and his 
extension of "society" to include "free society" rather than "prison society," constitutes 
misconduct. (Brief, pp.34-36.) This claim fails not only because of Dunlap's failure to establish 
fundamental error, but also on the merits. 
The propensity aggravator states, "The defendant, by prior conduct or conduct in the 
commission of the murder at hand, has exhibited a propensity to commit murder which will 
probably constitute a continuing threat to society." I.C. §19-2515(9)(h) (1984). This Court has 
narrowed the class of people eligible for the death penalty by limiting the aggravator as follows: 
We would construe "propensity" to exclude, for example, a person who has no 
inclination to kill but in an episode of rage, such as during an emotional 
family or lover's quarrel, commits the offense of murder. We would doubt 
that most of those convicted of murder would again commit murder, and 
rather we construe the "propensity" language to specify that person who is a 
willing, predisposed killer, a killer who tends toward destroying the life of 
another, one who kills with less than the normal amount of provocation. We 
would hold that propensity assumes a proclivity, susceptibility, and even an 
affinity toward committing the act of murder. 
State v. Creech, 105 Idaho 362, 380-81, 670 P.2d 463 (1983). 
Dunlap's contention that the propensity aggravator IS limited to "prison society" is 
contrary to the plain language of the aggravator. There is no reference to it being limited to a 
"prison society" and Dunlap has failed to cite any case in which such an aggravator has been so 
limited. The manner in which "society" is used was well known to the legislature, which would 
have provided additional limiting language if it intended for it to be limited to something other 
than its general meaning, particularly in light of the fact that even death sentenced inmates have 
been known to escape from prison or otherwise have the opportunity to be released back into 
society as a result of convictions being reversed or other circumstances. There was no objection 
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to the prosecutor's statement because there was no basis for one. Dunlap has failed to establish 
Perry's first or second prongs. Finally, because Dunlap has failed to establish his sentence 
would have been different if counsel had objected since the jury found two other aggravators and 
weighed the collective mitigation against those aggravators individually, any alleged error was 
harmless. See Wood, 132 Idaho at 719-20; Hoffman, 236 F.3d at 541-42. 
7. Alleged Vouching And Bolstering By Dr. Matthews 
After providing Dr. Matthews exhibit 39, which included statements from Dunlap that he 
"made up or malingered mental illness," the prosecutor asked, "In these particular situations, 
how should that affect the diagnosis of Mr. Dunlap? . .. What weight should the jury give it?" 
(#32773 Tr.Vol.XI, p.153.) Dr. Matthews responded: 
The jury should give these powerful weight. The jury should pay very, 
very great attention to them because, first of all, it is unusual for people who are 
malingering to actually admit it. And what you have got here, basically, are a 
bunch of seasoned mental health professionals who admit that Mr. Dunlap pulled 
the wool over their eyes. And it is only when, you know, when he turned around 
and said he was faking it that they recognized it. So I think these are some of the 
most important documents in the record. 
(Id., pp.153-54.) Dr. Matthews was also asked about whether he found anything significant from 
Dr. Martin Brooks' 1992 report, and responded: 
What interested me most about Dr. Brooks' report, which was prepared 
for his defense attorney, he said, "The subject does not present a history of 
hallucinations or delusions." And it is interesting to me that prior to his 
homicides, no one ever thought he had schizophrenia. No one ever thought he 
had schizo-affective disorder. Those are conditions that only when he started 
committing major crimes, did people start wondering whether he might have. 
(Id., pp.166-67.) Finally, after the prosecutor noted Dr. Matthews was being compensated for his 
testimony, he was asked if there was anything preventing him from agreeing with the defense 
experts if it was warranted by the evidence. (ld., p.183.) Dr. Matthews responded, "No. I would 
like to add that for a forensic scientist, a forensic psychiatrist, a forensic person of any sort, our 
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primary, ethical obligations is honesty and objectivity. And if I were not willing to do that then, 
you know, I should be a professor de-emeritus, instead of a professor emeritus." (Id., p.184.) 
Dunlap contends these statements were improper because Dr. Matthews "bolstered his 
. own testimony, the reports of non-testifying witnesses with whom he agreed, and repeatedly 
invaded the province of the jury by telling jurors the weight they should assign evidence." 
(Brief, p.33.) Dunlap'S claim is premised upon State v. Perry, 139 Idaho 520, 525, 81 P.3d 1230 
(2003), where this Court concluded polygraph results are inadmissible even if offered "to prove 
only the truth of his statements by his body's involuntary psychological responses" because 
'" expert testimony which does nothing but vouch for the credibility of another witness 
encroaches upon the jury's vital and exclusive function to make credibility determinations, and 
therefore does not 'assist the trier of fact' as required by Rule 702. '" Dr. Matthews did not 
"vouch for the credibility of another witness," but merely discussed the importance of Dunlap's 
statements and other experts' analysis and conclusions in reaching his own determination that 
Dunlap was malingering. Even assuming Dr. Matthews was attempting to bolster his credibility, 
Dunlap has cited no authority prohibiting the same. Experts are required to "bolster" their 
testimony with credentials, experience, knowledge, and expertise within the field they are 
testifying as a predicate to rendering an expert opinion. Put in context, Dr. Matthews' testimony 
was nothing more than an explanation of his ethical obligations as a forensic psychiatrist. There 
was no objection because there was no basis for one, resulting in Dunlap failing to establish the 
first and second Perry prongs. Based upon the evidence from the sentencing hearing regarding 
mitigation, the extraordinary strength of the aggravation evidence, and the de minimus nature of 
the comments, Dunlap has also failed to establish Perry's third prong. 
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XI. 
Dunlap's Claim Regarding Not Subjecting The State's Evidence To Idaho's Rules Of Evidence 
Was Not Preserved For Appeal 
A. Introduction And Relevant Facts 
The state filed a motion asking that the respective parties be permitted to introduce "all 
relevant and reliable evidence during the sentencing phase of the trial, regardless of its 
admissibility under the Idaho Rules of Evidence." (#32773 R., pp.412-27.) Dunlap responded, 
conceding I.C. §19-2515(6) establishes, "the state and the defendant shall be entitled to present 
all relevant evidence in aggravation and mitigation" and suggesting a hearing where the parties 
could identify exhibits and witnesses and the court could determine "if the proposed evidence is 
relevant and admissible for sentencing purposes." (Id., pp.445-46.) The court agreed, 
explaining, "In sentencing, I think that is pretty much the law." (#32773 Tr.1-6-06, p.26.) 
For the first time on appeal, Dunlap contends the district court violated his right to due 
process by refusing to require the state to abide by Idaho's rules of evidence even though, 
Dunlap contends, he was not required to abide by those rules, and that the court's failure to abide 
by a repealed version ofI.C. §19-2516 violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. (Brief, pp.37-40.) Not 
only must Dunlap establish fundamental error, but any alleged error was invited. Moreover, 
because the factual premise of Dunlap's claim is false, any alleged error fails or was harmless. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of review for constitutional violations is articulated above in section IV(B). 
C. Dunlap Has Failed To Establish Fundamental Error 
Not only did Dunlap fail to object to the state's motion regarding the applicability of 
Idaho's rules of evidence such that he must now establish fundamental error, his attorney agreed 
that admission of evidence in a capital sentencing is governed by state statute (#32773 R., 
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pp.445-46), which requires only that "the state and the defendant shall be entitled to present all 
relevant evidence in aggravation and mitigation," I.e. §19-2515(6); there is no requirement that 
the state's evidence be subjected to Idaho's rules of evidence. Therefore, any error associated 
with the court not requiring the state's evidence to be subjected to Idaho's rules of evidence is 
invited and cannot be reviewed on appeal. See Norton, 254 P.3d at 88. 
Moreover, I.e. §19-2515(6) is consistent with I.R.E. 101(e)(3), which explains Idaho's 
rules of evidence do not apply at sentencing hearings; there is no exception for capital sentencing 
hearings. Based upon I.R.E. 101(e)(3), this Court has concluded, except for privileges, the rules 
of evidence do not apply in sentencing hearings. State v. Jeppson, 138 Idaho 71, 75, 57 P.3d 782 
(2002). This principle has been extended to capital sentencing hearings, Porter, 130 Idaho at 
795, and is consistent with Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedent. See Williams v. New 
York, 337 U.S. 241, 250 (1949) ("modem concepts individualizing punishment have made it all 
the more necessary that a sentencing judge not be denied an opportunity to obtain pertinent 
information by a requirement of rigid adherence to restrictive rules of evidence properly applied 
to the trial"); Creech v. Arave, 947 F.2d 873, 880 (9th Cir. 1991) (trial judge "may appropriately 
conduct a broad inquiry largely unlimited as to the kind of information to be considered or the 
source of such information"). 
Additionally, Dunlap's contention that statutory aggravating factors are "elements" was 
rejected by this Court in Porter v. State, 140 Idaho 780, 784, 102 P .3d 1099 (2004) ("Ring did 
not elevate those statutory aggravating circumstances into elements of a crime, nor did it create a 
new crime"). Moreover, Dunlap's claim, which is premised upon the reports of David Doten and 
Dr. Brooks, is factually without merit because he has failed to explain under what rule of 
evidence the reports would have been excluded. 
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Dunlap's argument regarding the Ex Post Facto Clause, based upon I.C. § 19-2516 
(repealed), not only fails for the reasons detailed above, but even if the statute should have been 
applied, which the state disputes, because Dunlap failed to make an "explicit request for the 
formal hearing ... , the court may reach its sentencing decision by receiving the unsworn formal 
statements presented by both sides." State v. Coutts, 124 Idaho 415, 113, 860 P.2d 618 (1993). 
As explained in Creech, 105 Idaho at 366-67, the statute must be read in conjunction with the 
earlier version ofLC. §19-2515, and when read together "the closing language ofI.C. § 19-2516 
clearly and unambiguously provides an exception to the otherwise required oral testimony and 
that those authorizations of I.C. § 19-2515 fall within the purview of the intended exception." 
Because Dunlap never requested a "formal hearing," there simply could not have been a 
violation of the statute and, therefore, no violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause. 
XII. 
Dunlap'S Claim Regarding "Law Of The Case" As It Applies To The "Utter Disregard" 
Aggravator Was Not Preserved For Appeal 
A. Introduction And Relevant Facts 
When Dunlap was sentenced in 1992, the district court concluded the state had proven 
the "utter disregard" aggravator beyond a reasonable doubt, but refused to consider the 
aggravator because the Ninth Circuit decided it was unconstitutionally vague in Creech v. Arave, 
947 F.2d at 883-85 (#19928 R., pp.359-62), a decision reversed by the Supreme Court in 1983, 
in Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. at 470-0l. Prior to his resentencing, the state notified Dunlap it 
would be requesting the death penalty based, in part, upon the utter disregard aggravator. 
(#32773 R., pp.164-66.) Along with two other statutory aggravators, the jury found the state 
proved the utter disregard aggravator beyond a reasonable doubt. (Id., p.686.) For the first time 
on appeal, Dunlap contends that the district court's submission of the utter disregard aggravator 
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to the jury unconstitutionally violated the "law of the case" doctrine. (Brief, pp.40-42.) Because 
he did not object to submission of the utter disregard aggravator to the jury based upon the law of 
the case doctrine and has failed to establish fundamental error, Dunlap's claim fails. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of review for constitutional violations is articulated above in section IV(B). 
C. Dunlap Has Failed To Establish Fundamental Error 
As explained in Stuart v. State, 136 Idaho 490, 495, 36 P.2d 1278 (2001) (quote and 
citation omitted), "The law of the case doctrine states that upon an appeal, the Supreme Court, in 
deciding a case presented states in its opinion a principle or rule of law necessary to the decision, 
such pronouncement becomes the law of the case, and must be adhered to throughout its 
subsequent progress, both in the trial court and upon subsequent appeal. ... " In Stuart, the 
petitioner asserted the state was barred under the law of the case doctrine from asserting on 
remand additional exceptions to the exclusionary rule. Id. Recognizing that while "the law of 
the case doctrine 'directs a court's discretion, it does not limit the tribunal's power,'" this Court 
concluded its prior holdings in the petitioner's case did not preclude the state from asserting 
other exceptions. Id. (quoting Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605,618 (1983». Further, while 
courts have recognized the law of the case doctrine "has developed to maintain consistency and 
avoid reconsideration of matters once decided during the course of a single continuing lawsuit," 
Ingle v. Circuit City, 408 F.3d 592, 594 (9th Cir. 2005) (quotes and citation omitted), based upon 
the fluid nature of the law, courts have uniformly adopted an exception to the doctrine based 
upon intervening changes in the law. See Davis v. U.S., 417 U.S. 333, 342 (1974); U.S. v. 
Cuddy, 147 F.3d 1111, 1114 (9th Cir. 1998). The Ninth Circuit has concluded the district court 
abuses its discretion by applying the law of the case doctrine if there is an intervening change in 
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o the law. Ingle, 408 F.3d at 594. As discussed in Thompson v. Hagan, 96 Idaho 19,25, 523 P.2d 
1365 (1974), the question is not whether the district court is bound by the law of the case, but the 
retroactive application of the new rule oflaw. 
Dunlap's claim fails the first Perry prong because even if the law of the case doctrine is a 
. constitutional principle, he has failed to establish an actual violation of the doctrine. Rather, this 
issue is analogous to the resentencing of Thomas Creech, in which the trial court found an 
aggravating circumstance allegedly based upon the same facts that were earlier found to 
constitute mitigation. State v. Creech, 132 Idaho 1,7,966 P.2d 1 (1998). Rejecting Creech's 
argument and relying upon Poland v. Arizona, 476 U.S. 147, 155-56 (1986), this Court 
concluded, "the district court was not barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause from reconsidering 
existing information, changing mitigating factors and weighing evidence differently at the most 
recent sentencing." Id. at 8. More importantly, the Supreme Court's decision in Arave v. 
Creech, 507 U.S. at 470-71, which reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision in Creech v. Arave, 947 
F.2d at 883-85, constitutes an intervening change in the law. Dunlap's law of the case doctrine 
fails because, based upon the Supreme Court's decision, the jury was not barred from 
considering the utter disregard aggravator under the law of the case doctrine. Therefore, 
Dunlap's claim fails the first and second Perry prongs because not only has Dunlap failed to cite 
any authority or establish that the law of the case actually violates the Constitution, based upon 
the facts of this case the error does not plainly exist, which is undoubtedly why trial counsel did 
not raise an objection. Finally, because the jury found two other aggravators and weighed the 
collective mitigation against those aggravators individually, any alleged error was harmless 
under Perry's third prong. See Wood, 132 Idaho at 105-06. 
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XIII. 
Dunlap's Claim Regarding The "Utter Disregard" Aggravator Being Unconstitutionally Vague 
Was Not Preserved For Appeal 
A. Introduction And Relevant Facts 
Attempting to bolster his claim regarding the utter disregard jury instruction discussed in 
section III(C)( 4) above, for the first time on appeal, Dunlap contends the narrowing construction 
for the utter disregard aggravator in Osborn, 102 Idaho at 419, is unconstitutionally vague 
because he was sentenced by a jury and not a judge. (Brief, pp.42-44.) Dunlap's claim is 
premised upon the contention that the Supreme Court's decision in Creech, 507 U.S. at 474-75, 
approving the limiting language of the aggravator from Osborne, is based upon the fact that at 
the time judges rather than juries found statutory aggravating factors in Idaho. Because he did 
not object to the submission of the utter disregard aggravator to the jury based upon the law of 
the case doctrine and has failed to establish fundamental error, Dunlap's claim fails. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"The constitutionality of a statute is a question of law which this Court reviews de novo." 
State v. Hart, 135 Idaho 827, 829,25 P.3d 850 (2001). 
C. Dunlap Has Failed To Establish Fundamental Error 
In Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 774 (1990), the Supreme Court reaffirmed, "where 
discretion is afforded a sentencing body on a matter so grave as the determination of whether a 
human life should be taken or spared, that discretion must be suitably directed and limited so as 
to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action." The state is required to "channel 
the sentencer's discretion by 'clear and objective standards' that provide 'specific and detailed 
guidance,' and 'make rationally reviewable the process for imposing a sentence of death. '" Id. 
(quoting Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428 (1980)). These standards must narrow the class 
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. of people eligible for the death penalty. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 62, 87 (1983). With these 
standards in mind, the Supreme Court concluded the Osborn limiting language "defines a state of 
mind that is ascertainable from surrounding facts." Creech, 507 U.S. at 474. This determination 
was not premised upon whether a judge or jury made the requisite finding, but the "ordinary 
. usage" of the phrase, "cold-blooded, pitiless slayer." Id. at 471-73. The Court further found the 
limiting language "genuinely narrow[ed] the class of persons eligible for the death penalty," not 
because a judge was the fact-finder, but because Idaho's "statutory scheme" permitted the fact-
finder to "find that not all Idaho capital defendants are 'cold-blooded' ... because some within 
the broad class of first-degree murderers do exhibit feeling." Id. at 474-76. 
Dunlap also relies upon State v. Lankford, 116 Idaho 860, 876-77, 781 P.2d 197 (1989), 
which addresses the heinous, atrocious and cruel aggravator ("HAC"), and in which this Court 
distinguished Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 357 (1988), based only upon judge sentencing in 
Idaho. However, as explained in Leavitt v. Arave, 383 F.3d 809, 835-37 (9th Cir. 2004), 
Maynard is distinguished not just because the factfinder was a judge, but because Osborn further 
restricts the application of HAC to those cases "where the actual commission of the capital 
felony was accompanied by such additional acts as to set the crime apart from the norm of 
capital felonies -- the conscienceless or pitiless crime which is unnecessarily torturous to the 
victim," which is language approved in Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 255-56 (1976). 
Because the Supreme COUli's decision in Crecch was not based upon whether the fact 
finder was a judge or a jury, the utter disregard aggravator is not unconstitutionally vague. 
Therefore, Dunlap cannot establish the first or second Perry prongs. Because the jury found two 
other aggravators and weighed the collective mitigation against those aggravators individually, 
any alleged error was harmless under Perry's third prong. See Wood, 132 Idaho at 105-06. 
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XIV. 
Dunlap's Claims That The Admission Of Prior Reports Violated His Right Of Confrontation Or 
The Fifth Amendment Were Not Preserved For Appeal 
. A. Introduction And Relevant Facts 
During his testimony, Dr. Beaver was questioned regarding a plethora of prior mental 
health examinations and reports that had been conducted and written regarding Dunlap, 
including Doten's 1991 full mental status evaluation (#32773 Tr.VoI.XI, pp.83-85, 109-11; 
. Resentencing exhibit 43) and Dr. Brooks' 1992 mental status examination (id., pp.23, 111-13; 
Resentencing exhibit 44). Without objection, Doten and Dr. Brooks' reports were admitted at 
the resentencing. (Id., p.168.) 
Dunlap contends admission of the reports violated his confrontation rights under the 
Sixth Amendment and Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). (Brief, pp.44-46.) Not 
only has Dunlap failed to establish fundamental error, his claim fails because the confrontation 
clause does not apply to capital sentencing hearings. 
Dunlap also contends the district court violated his Fifth Amendment right against self-
. incrimination by admitting Dr. Brooks' report and "objectionable portions of Dr. [Michael] 
Estess's 1992 report," which were allegedly "admitted through Dr. Matthews' testimony as well 
as Dr. [Roderick] Pettis's affidavit." (Brief, pp.46-50.) Not only has Dunlap failed to establish 
fundamental error, any alleged error was invited. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"Whether the admission of [evidence] violated [Dunlap's] right to confront witnesses 
under the Sixth Amendment is a question of law over which the Court exercises free review." 
Shackelford, 247 P.3d at 599. The standard of review for other constitutional violations is 
articulated above in section IV(B). 
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. C. Dunlap's Confrontation Clause Claim Was Not Preserved 
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment provides, "In all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against 
him." After Dunlap pled guilty, the Supreme Court abandoned its prior Confrontation Clause 
. analysis from Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 46 (1980), and concluded the Clause bars "admission of 
testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to 
testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination." Crawford, 541 
U.S. at 53-54. 
Idaho's courts have repeatedly rejected the contention that the Confrontation Clause 
applies at sentencing hearings, including those involving the death penalty. "The rationale for 
this rule is, in part, 'the belief that modem penological policies, which favor sentencing based 
upon the maximum amount of information about the defendant, would be thwarted by restrictive 
procedural and evidentiary rules.'" State v. Guerrero, l30 Idaho 311, 312, 940 P.2d 419 (Ct. 
App. 1997) (quotingSivak v. State, 112 Idaho 197,216,731 P.2d 192 (1986)). Dunlap contends 
these cases are inapposite because they were decided prior to Ring v. Arizona 536 U.S. 584 
(2002), and Crawford, 541 U.S. 36. (Brief, p.46.) However, Dunlap has failed to name any 
jurisdiction that has concluded the Confrontation Clause applies at a capital sentencing because 
of Ring or Crawford. In U.S. v. Littlesun, 444 F.3d 1196, 1200 (9th Cir. 2006) (quotes and 
citation omitted), the Ninth Circuit, relying upon Williams, 337 U.S. 241, concluded, "the law on 
hearsay at sentencing is still what it was before Crawford; hearsay is admissible at sentencing, so 
long as it is accompanied by some minimal indicia of reliability." See Rodgers v. State, 948 
So.2d 655, 674-75 (Fla. 2006) (Cantero, J., concurring) (collecting federal appellate cases 
denying Confrontation Clause rights at sentencing). 
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Coble v. Dretke, 444 F.3d 345, 353-54 (5 th Cir. 2006), superseded by Coble v. 
Quarterman, 496 F.3d 430 (5th Cir. 2007), and State v. Bell, 603 S.E.2d 93, 115-16 (N.C. 2004), 
are not contrary because the courts did not address the question of whether the Confrontation 
Clause applies at a capital sentencing. In Coble, 496 F.3d at 439, the court assumed the right 
exists, but concluded the reports admitted were not testimonial. Similarly, in Bell, 603 S.E.2d at 
116-117, the court assumed the right exists, but concluded any error was not prejudicial. 
Even if the Confrontation Clause applied at his sentencing hearing, Dunlap has failed to 
establish Doten and Dr. Brooks' reports are "testimonial." The primary evil at which the 
Confrontation Clause is aimed is the government's gathering of ex parte evidence with the 
purpose of using that evidence later at trial. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50-52; State v. Hooper, 145 
Idaho 139, 143, 176 P.3d 911 (2007). The Court explained the "testimonial" characterization 
"applies at a minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a 
former trial and to police interrogations." Crawford, at 68. The Court made clear the core 
. concern behind the Confrontation Clause was ex parte testimony or its functional equivalent, 
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 47-49,51-52, and that "[t]he Sixth Amendment must be interpreted with 
this focus in mind." Id. at 50. See also Shackelford, 247 P.3d at 599-600 (discussing the 
parameters of Crawford and Hooper). The Supreme Court recognized, "[m]ost of the hearsay 
exceptions covered statements that by their nature [are] not testimonial -- for example business 
records .... " Crawford at 56. Therefore, the two reports are not testimonial because of their 
admissibility under I.R.E. 703. Even if not admissible under I.R.E. 703, as explained in Coble, 
496 F.3d at 439, reports of this nature are not testimonial under Crawford. 
Considering the arguments above, Dunlap cannot establish either the first or second ~ 
prongs because there was no constitutional violation, and even if there was, it was not plain. See 
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State v. Grove, 2011 WL 1085996, *9 (Idaho Ct. App. 2011) (court could not ascertain from the 
record whether trial counsel's failure to object to expert's testimony on basis of Confrontation 
Clause was not a tactical decision). Further, based upon the plethora of other evidence regarding 
Dunlap's mental health, he has failed to establish any alleged error was not harmless. 
D. Dunlap's Fifth Amendment Claim Was Not Preserved 
While Dunlap correctly notes Dr. Matthews discussed Dr. Brooks' report (#32773 
Tr.Vol.XI, pp.166-67), it was first discussed by Dr. Beaver (id., pp.23, 111-13). Dunlap's 
contention that Dr. Estess' report was admitted through Dr. Matthews' testimony is wrong; the 
only reference by a witness to any information from Dr. Estess was solicited by Dunlap's 
attorney from Dr. Beaver, during which there was an immediate objection by the prosecutor with 
the district court ruling there would be no reference to Dr. Estess' report. (Id., pp.127-33.) Dr. 
Pettis' affidavit, which was part of a bundle of defense exhibits (#32773 R., p.733, Resentencing 
exhibit R) admitted after the parties rested their cases (#32773 Tr.Vol.XII, pA), referenced Drs. 
Brooks and Estess' prior reports (#32773 R., p.733, Resentencing exhibit R, pp.13-15). Because 
the introduction of Dr. Pettis' report was at the insistence of Dunlap's attorney, any alleged error 
was invited and cannot be reviewed on appeal. See Norton, 254 P.3d at 88. 
Moreover, because Dunlap did not object and has failed to establish fundamental error, 
his Fifth Amendment claim fails. Dunlap's principle argument is premised upon Wood, 132 
Idaho at 100-01, and the state's concession during his first post-conviction case that he had to be 
resentenced, which was based in part upon Wood and the testimony of Dr. Estess at the first 
sentencing. (Brief, ppA6-50.) However, the procedural posture of Dunlap's case has changed 
drastically since he was first sentenced by the Honorable William H. Woodland, who made 
written factual findings regarding imposition of the death penalty. (#19928 R., pp.354-86.) 
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In Wood, 132 Idaho at 100, trial counsel did not object to the district court using a 
. psychological report that was to be attached to a presentence report even though the report had 
not been completed and Wood was deprived of the opportunity to be advised of his privilege 
against self incrimination. Moreover, trial counsel did not object to the state calling the author of 
the report to testify against Wood at his sentencing. ld. at 101. This Court concluded counsel's 
failure to object constituted ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668 (1984), but vacated only the statutory aggravator that was based upon the offending 
report and testimony. Id. 
At Dunlap's initial sentencing, the state called Dr. Estess to testify against Dunlap 
(#19928 Tr., pp.314-406) and Judge Woodland relied upon that testimony for every statutory 
aggravating factor and weighing whether the mitigation made imposition of the death penalty 
unjust (#i 9928 R., pp.354-86). At Dunlap's resentencing, the state did not call Dr. Estess as a 
witness or introduce evidence associated with his report or prior testimony. Rather, Dunlap 
introduced snippets of Dr. Estess' prior report through Dr. Pettis' affidavit. Therefore, not only 
is there no constitutional violation because any alleged violation would have been waived, but 
Dunlap cannot establish Perry's second prong because counsel had a valid tactical reason for 
introducing the entirety of Dr. Pettis' affidavit, which was so important it was the only portion of 
the "mitigation binder" counsel discussed during closing argument. (#32773 Tr.Vol.XII, pp.63-
66.) Counsel noted Dr. Pettis "has the M.D, [sic] like Dr. Matthews. He received his medical 
degree." (ld., p.63.) Counsel read from Dr. Pettis' conclusions, noting the different diagnoses 
uncovered by multiple experts. (ld., p.64.) Counsel concluded his argument by reading Dr. 
Pettis' opinion that "based upon my training and experience ... Tim does not malinger mental 
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illness." (Id., p.65.) Counsel's closing argument establishes it was a tactical decision to admit 
Dr. Pettis' report. In other words, any alleged error is not "plain" as required under Perry. 
The same is true regarding Dr. Brooks' report even though it was introduced by the state 
. without objection from Dunlap - counsel had tactical reasons to not object. Moreover, unlike 
Dunlap's first sentencing, the report was not disclosed to the state until after its content was 
known to Dunlap's attorneys. In other words, what Dunlap fails to recognize is the fact that, 
unlike his first attorneys who agreed to disclosure of Dr. Estess' report to the state without first 
knowing the contents of the report, Dunlap's resentencing attorneys were fully aware of the 
contents of both Drs. Estess and Brooks' reports and, for tactical reasons, allowed the 
presentation of portions of the reports to go before the jury. 
Finally, based upon the de minimus nature of Dr. Brooks' report and the snippets from 
Dr. Estess' report contained in Dr. Pettis' affidavit, coupled with the overwhelming evidence of 
aggravation, particularly from other records demonstrating Dunlap is a malingerer and Dr. 
Matthews' testimony, Dunlap has failed to establish any alleged error was not harmless under 
Perry's third prong. 
XV. 
The Claim That Idaho's Death Penalty Violates The Eighth Amendment Because It Permits The 
Execution Of The Mentally III Was Not Preserved For Appeal 
Dunlap contends subjecting mentally ill defendants to the death penalty violates the 
Eighth Amendment. (Brief, pp.50-54.) Dunlap's claim fails because he is raising the claim for 
the first time on appeal and cannot establish fundamental error, particularly Perry's first prong, 
because execution of the mentally ill is not unconstitutional. 
The Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of cruel and unusual punishment, which 
is determined by "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." 
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Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311 (2002) (quotes and citation omitted). "Proportionality 
review under those evolving standards should be informed by objective factors to the maximum 
possible extent" and "the clearest and most reliable objective evidence of contemporary values is 
the legislation enacted by the country's legislatures." Id. at 311 (quotes and citations omitted). 
Dunlap has failed to reference any jurisdiction that has excused murderers from the death 
penalty merely because they are mentally ill, presumably because no court has concluded 
"evolving standards of decency" exclude mentally ill murderers from the death penalty or that 
Atkins should be so extended. See State v. Johnson, 207 S.W.2d 24, 51 (Mo. 2006) ("Both 
federal and state courts have refused to extend Atkins to mental illness situations") (citing cases). 
In Diaz v. State, 945 So.2d 1136, 1151 (Fla. 2006), the court rejected a recommendation from the 
American Bar Association to implement policies to prevent severely mentally ill murderers from 
being executed, explaining, "neither this Court nor the Supreme Court has recognized mental 
illness as a per se bar to execution. Instead, mental illness can be considered ... a nonstatutory 
mitigating factor." Rejecting the extension of Atkins to mentally ill murderers, the Ohio 
Supreme Court explained, "Mental illnesses come in many forms; different illnesses may affect a 
defendant's moral responsibility or deterrability in different ways and to different degrees." 
State v. Hancock, 840 N.E.2d 1032, 1059 (Ohio 2006). Likewise, the Supreme Court has 
recognized the significant differences between mental retardation and mental illness. See Heller 
v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 321-22 (1993). Presumably, it is these differences that have limited 
"evolving standards of decency" from exempting mentally ill murderers from the death penalty. 
Rather, evidence of mental illness is properly presented as mitigation on a case-by-case basis, 
particularly in light of the varying types of mental illness and the degree with which those 
respective illnesses impact the murderer. Dunlap has failed to establish the first and second 
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Perry prongs because the Constitution does not prohibit the execution of murderers who were 
mentally ill at the time of the murder, sentencing, or execution. 
XVI. 
Based Upon Dunlap's Failure To Demonstrate Any Sentencing Error, His Claim Of 
Cumulative Error Necessarily Fails 
Dunlap contends if any of the errors alleged above are harmless, under the "cumulative 
error doctrine" this Court should reverse his death sentence. (Brief, p.54.) "When there is an 
accumulation of irregularities, each of which by itself might be harmless, but when aggregated, 
the errors show the absence of a fair trial, the cumulative error doctrine requires a reversal of the 
conviction as the trial has contravened the defendant's right to due process." Payne, 146 Idaho at 
568 (quotes and citation omitted). Because Dunlap has failed to demonstrate error, let alone an 
aggregate of harmless errors, this Court cannot reverse based on the cumulative error doctrine, 
particularly since most are being raised for the first time on appeal. 
XVII. 
Dunlap Has Failed To Meet His Burden Of Establishing The Court Abused Its Discretion By 
Denying His Request To Test The Two Murder Weapons 
A. Introduction And Relevant Facts 
During post-conviction proceedings, Dunlap filed a twenty-page Motion for Discovery 
(#37270 R., pp.429-20), which included a request to have the shotgun he used to murder Tonya 
tested by his expert to support a claim of lAC (id., pp.443-44). Six months after the discovery 
deadline expired, Dunlap filed a Motion for Transfer of Evidence for Expert Examination, which 
included a request to have the crossbow he used to murder Belinda (id., pp.91-94) - which was 
not even present in Idaho (id., p.631) - released to his expert for testing. The district court denied 
the motion to have the crossbow tested because it was untimely, the weapon was irrelevant to the 
resentencing, and Dunlap failed to establish his expert had any "expertise or experience in regard 
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to the crossbow." (Id., p.633.) The court denied further testing of the shotgun because there was 
no curriculum vitae substantiating Dunlap's expert's credentials or a "showing that he has any 
other test that he could perform that would be any different." (Id., p.646.) Dunlap filed a motion 
for reconsideration that included his expert's curriculum vitae and affidavit (id., pp.656-64), 
which the court denied (id., p.748). 
Dunlap contends the district court abused its discretion because the testing was required 
to establish resentencing counsel were ineffective by failing to have the weapons tested to 
support his contention that Tonya's murder was not intentional. (Brief, pp.56-57.) Dunlap has 
failed to establish the district court abused its discretion. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"The decision to authorize discovery during post-conviction relief is a matter left to the 
sound discretion of the district court. Unless discovery is necessary to protect an applicant's 
substantial rights, the district court is not required to order discovery." Hall v. State, --- Idaho --, 
253 P.3d 716, 719 (2011) (quotes and citation omitted). 
C. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion 
While post-conviction cases are civil in nature, State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676, 678, 
662 P.2d 548 (1983), the rules of discovery contained in Idaho's rules of civil procedure do not 
apply in post-conviction cases. I.C.R. 57(b). "When an applicant believes discovery is 
necessary for acquisition of evidence to support a claim for post-conviction relief, the applicant 
must obtain authorization from the court to conduct discovery." Murphy v. State, 143 Idaho 139, 
148, 139 P.3d 741 (Ct. App. 2006). "In order to be granted discovery, a post-conviction 
applicant must identify the specific subject matter where discovery is requested and why 
discovery as to those matters is necessary to his or her application." Hall, 253 P.3d at 719 
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(quotes and citation omitted). Discovery standards in capital post-conviction cases are no 
different than non-capital cases, id. at 727, nor is there a due process violation based upon these 
, standards, Aeschilman v. State, 132 Idaho 397, 402,973 P.2d 749 (Ct. App. 1999). 
Contending retesting of the shotgun would have supported his claim that he did not 
intend to shoot Tonya, Dunlap argues he should have been permitted to retest the shotgun to 
support a claim of lAC because trial counsel did not have the gun tested. During resentencing 
Dwight Van Hom testified he conducted a trigger-pull test of the shotgun in December 2005, and 
concluded the trigger-pull was within manufacturer specifications and there was nothing 
consistent with a "very low trigger-pull weight or a hair trigger." (#32773 Tr.Vol.VII, pp.56-58.) 
Van Hom also explained, because the shotgun had been in police custody for over fourteen 
years, there were some things that could cause the trigger-pull to change (id., pp.58-59) even 
though there were no alterations made to the gun (id., p.63). 
Post-conviction cases are "not a vehicle for unrestrained testimony or retesting of 
physical evidence introduced at the criminal trial." Murphy, 143 Idaho at 152. As III 
Raudebaugh v. State, 135 Idaho 602, 605, 21 P.3d 924 (200l), Dunlap's allegations are 
speculative because "[t]here is no showing that the state's testing was flawed or that there is new 
technology that would make current testing more reliable." Dunlap failed to make the requisite 
showing that retesting by his expert was mandated; the jury was already aware the trigger-pull 
could have changed. Moreover, the key evidence regarding Dunlap's intent was not the trigger-
pull, but the witnesses who testified regarding his actions at the time he shot Tonya and his 
confessions that he shot her because "she did not give him all of the money." (#32773 
Tr.Vol.VII, p.121.) Not only did Dunlap admit he pulled the trigger (id., p.141), he admitted he 
shot Tonya "to teach her a lesson" because he was angry she allegedly failed to give him all the 
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· money (id. Vol. VIII, p.12). Testing of the crossbow was even more tangential, which Dunlap 
contends was necessary to "show [his] expectation for the shotgun trigger-pull was impacted by 
his experience with the less sensitive crossbow." (Brief, p.57.) Not only was Dunlap's request 
untimely, the crossbow was not in Idaho and he never alleged his experience with it impacted his 
· "expectations for the shotgun trigger-pull" or that such information was given to his attorneys 
mandating it be tested. Dunlap's request to have the shotgun and crossbow tested was nothing 
more than a fishing expedition, which the district court properly denied. See Murphy, 143 Idaho 
at 148 (''' Fishing expedition' discovery should not be allowed. The UP CPA provides a forum 
· for known grievances, not an opportunity to research for grievances"). 
XVIII. 
Dunlap Has Failed To Meet His Burden Of Establishing The District Court Abused Its 
Discretion By Denying His Motion To DisqualifY For Cause 
A. Introduction And Relevant Facts 
On July 25, 2008, more than two years after filing his post-conviction petition, Dunlap 
filed a motion to disqualify Judge Harding for cause based upon Dunlap's belief Judge Harding 
could not be impartial because of the financial impact Dunlap's case could have on Caribou 
County. (#37270 R., pp.l167-89.) Judge Harding denied Dunlap's motion, explaining there was 
no showing of an appearance of bias, let alone actual bias. (#37270 Tr. 9-19-08.) Dunlap 
contends the following establish an appearance of bias: (1) the financial impact of his sentencing 
on Caribou County; (2) the alleged necessity of having Judge Harding testify regarding his 
involvement with the Caribou County Commissioners regarding finances; and (3) "conflicting 
allegiances" stemming from financial concerns that could affect Judge Harding's ability to be 
reelected. (Brief, pp.57-61.) Dunlap has failed to establish Judge Harding abused his discretion 
by denying the motion. 
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B. Standard Of Review 
The denial ofa motion to disqualify a judge under both I.R.C.P. 40(d)(1) and 40(d)(2) is 
reviewed for an abuse of discretion "and the burden is on the person asserting error to show an 
abuse of discretion." Merrill v. Gibson, 139 Idaho 840, 843, 87 P.2d 949 (2004); see also Wood, 
132 Idaho at 107. 
C. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion 
This Court has repeatedly rejected claims of bias on the part of district judges in capital 
cases. In Pizzuto v. State, 134 Idaho 793, 799, 10 P.3d 742 (2000) (quotes and citations 
omitted), this Court again detailed the standards for disqualification for cause: 
It has been held that the right to due process requires an impartial trial judge. 
However, a judge may not be disqualified for prejudice unless it is shown that 
the prejudice is directed against the party and is of such nature and character 
as would render it improbable that under the circumstances the party could 
have a fair and impartial trial. In order to constitute legal bias or prejudice, 
allegations of prejudice in post-conviction and sentence reduction proceedings 
must state facts that do more than simply explain the course of events 
involved in a criminal trial. In Idaho a judge cannot be disqualified for actual 
prejudice unless it is shown that the prejudice is directed against the litigant 
and is of such a nature and character that it would make it impossible for the 
litigant to get a fair trial. Whether the judge's involvement in the defendant's 
cases reaches the point where disqualification from further participation in a 
case becomes necessary is left to the sound discretion of the trial judge. 
In Liteky v. U.S., 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994), the Supreme Court recognized, "judicial 
rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion." Merely 
because Judge Harding was involved in deciding motions associated with financing Dunlap's 
resentencing or post-conviction case does not constitute even the appearance of bias, let alone 
actual bias. Dunlap's claim is similar to a motion raised in State v. Lankford, 113 Idaho 688, 
701,747 P.2d 710 (1987) - "there is extreme community hostility and prejudice toward Lankford 
in Idaho County and that this community feeling makes it unreasonably difficult for the judge, 
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who is a resident of the community and an elected official, to impartially hear the affiant's 
petition" - which this Court rejected, explaining "Lankford's allegations of bias do not show any 
actual prejudice on the part of the judge directed toward Lankford of such a nature and character 
that it would have made it impossible for Lankford to get a fair post conviction hearing." Id. 
Other courts share this Court's analysis. See Lake County v. Nrg/Recovery Group, Inc., 144 F. 
Supp.2d 1316, 1321 (M.D. Florida, 2001) ("simply because the state court judge, who may be 
assigned to this case, is an elected official is not a reason to conclude that bias would be present. 
State court judges routinely handle cases raising controversial community issues"); County of 
Johnston v. City of Wilson, 525 S.E.2d 826, 828 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000) ("We are not inclined to 
set a standard that resident superior court judges cannot participate in proceedings in which the 
county where the judge resides, and not the judge themselves, has a potential interest in the 
proceedings"). As in City of Coeur d'Alene v. Simpson, 142 Idaho 839, 844, 136 P.3d 310 
(2006), the problem with Dunlap's argument "is that its logical and necessary application equates 
to a rule that would force many members of the judiciary out of cases." 
Finally, Dunlap's claim that Judge Harding was a "necessary witness" is frivolous. As 
detailed in section VII above, this Court has rejected claims that a "money judge" is required in 
capital proceedings. Therefore, any claim regarding Judge Harding's involvement in the 
financial aspect of Dunlap's resentencing was a legal question subject to a motion for summary 
dismissal without the need for an evidentiary hearing. Further, Judge Harding was not a 
"necessary witness" because the county commissioners could be called as witnesses. Because 
there are other individuals to testifY, Judge Harding could not be called as a witness. See Wood, 
132 Idaho at 108 ("The question then is whether there were facts not in the record that were 
relevant to the post-conviction proceedings and were not otherwise available to Wood"). 
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XIX. 
Dunlap Has Failed To Establish The State Withheld Exculpatory Evidence, That The Pleadings 
From His Pro Se Law Suit Would Have Resulted In A Different Sentence, Or That Matthews' 
Testimony Was False 
A. Introduction And Relevant Facts 
On May 7, 2004, Dunlap filed a pro se federal civil rights complaint challenging his 
conditions of confinement at the Idaho Maximum Security Institution ("IMSI") naming Jay 
. Green and Greg Fisher as defendants. (#37270 R., p.1094, attach. 85.) Represented by Deputy 
Attorney General William M. Loomis, Defendants filed an answer in April 2005. (ld., attach. 
87.) On March 31, 2006, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, supporting brief, 
statement of undisputed material facts, and supporting affidavits from Dr. Chad Sombke and 
Fisher. (ld., attachs. 92-96.) 
Dr. Sombke averred he \'las employed from 2002 to 2005 "at different times by the State 
of Idaho and by the Prison Health Services (PHS) as the Chief Psychologist," was familiar with 
Dunlap as he "oversaw his mental health treatment at IMSI between 2002 and February 2005" 
during which time "Dunlap was housed in the mental health unit due to his psychiatric needs," 
and that while Dunlap requested to be housed in general population, "the mental health unit at 
IMSI, was more appropriate." (Id., attach. 95, pp.1-2.) Fisher averred he was warden at IMSI 
from July 1, 2001, until July 2, 2005, was familiar with Dunlap, and "[b lased on Mr. Dunlap's 
prior behavior ... and the treatment recommendations of his mental health treatment providers, . 
. . concluded that the appropriate housing for him was in the outpatient mental health tier." (ld., 
attach. 96, pp.1-2.) In the statement of undisputed facts, Loomis contended, "At all times 
relevant to the Complaint, Dunlap was under the care of mental health professionals at IMSI due 
to psychotic and delusional behavior he exhibited while incarcerated;" Loomis also outlined 
Dunlap's psychiatric treatment at IMSI since 2002. (ld., attach. 94, pp.2-7.) 
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Dunlap contends "[t]his infonnation was material and should have been disclosed by the 
State pursuant to its Brady obligations," and "[g]iven the State's knowledge of Mr. Dunlap's 
mental illness, its presentation of Dr. Matthews' testimony that Mr. Dunlap was malingering 
mental illness was misconduct" under Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959). (Brief, pp.63-64.) 
The district court rejected this claim because the evidence was not known to the state prior to 
Dunlap's resentencing, Dr. Matthews' testimony was not false, and the evidence was not 
material under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), or Napue. (#37270 R., p.1996.) Because 
Dunlap failed to establish the documents were created prior to resentencing, the state withheld 
the infonnation contained therein, or materiality under Brady and Napue, his claim fails. 
B. Standard Of Review 
In Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 793, 102 P.3d 1108 (2004) (quotes and citation 
omitted), this Court reaffinned the standard of review in post-conviction cases in which 
summary dismissal was granted: 
In detennining whether a motion for summary disposition is properly 
granted, a court must review the facts in a light most favorable to the petitioner, 
and detennine whether they would entitle petitioner to relief if accepted as true. 
A court is required to accept the petitioner's unrebutted allegations as true, but 
need not accept the petitioner's conclusions. The standard to be applied to a trial 
court's detennination that no material issue of fact exists is the same type of 
determination as in a summary judgment proceeding. 
C. The Civil Rights Pleadings Do Not Violate Brady 
Under Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, the prosecution has a duty to disclose evidence that is both 
favorable to the defense and material to either guilt or punishment. To prove a Brady violation, 
Dunlap must show: "The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is 
exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, 
either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued." Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 
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263, 281-82 (1999). The Court discussed the issue of prejudice or materiality in Kyles v. 
Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995) (quotes and citation omitted): 
Bagley's touchstone of materiality is a reasonable probability of a different result, 
and the adjective is important. The question is not whether the defendant would 
more likely than not have received a different verdict with the evidence, but 
whether in its absence he received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a 
verdict worthy of confidence. A reasonable probability of a different result is 
accordingly shown when the government's evidentiary suppression undermines 
confidence in the outcome of the trial. 
The Court reiterated, once a reviewing court has found a constitutional violation applying the 
materiality test from U.S. v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985), there is no need for further 
harmless error analysis. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434-36. The Court also explained that in assessing 
materiality, the withheld evidence is viewed collectively, "not item-by-item." Id. at 436-38. 
There is nothing in the record establishing "the state," prior to resentencing, knew Dunlap 
was allegedly mentally ill and not malingering as alleged by Dr. Sombke in his post-sentencing 
affidavit. All of the summary judgment pleadings were filed after Dunlap's resentencing. 
Obviously, the state cannot be held responsible for information not known or developed until 
after resentencing. Moreover, Dunlap's reliance upon the affidavit of his investigator is 
unavailing. (Brief, p.65.) First, the affidavit is replete with hearsay and is not admissible 
evidence upon which post-conviction relief can be granted. Payne, 146 Idaho at 561. Second, 
while the investigator avers the deputy attorney general "told me he recalled reviewing Mr. 
Burnett's work and added some information to the memorandum in the thirty days leading up to 
the filing of the Motion for Summary Judgment" (#32720 R., p.1872, exhibit 16), that does not 
mean it was a full thirty days prior to the filing of the motion. Dunlap's investigator's 
. recollection of the conversation and the affidavit are simply too vague, which is why post-
conviction relief can be granted based only upon admissible evidence. 
62 
To the extent the state had an obligation to disclose the pleadings after resentencing, that 
obligation was met when the pleadings were served on Dunlap, who was representing himself. 
Further, while the various pleadings were not known until after the sentencing hearing, the state 
provided copies of the reports and entries from Dunlap's mental health treatment and 
disciplinary offense reports at IMSI to his attorneys prior to sentencing. (#32773 Tr.Vol.XI, 
pp.52, 90-105; #32773, R., p.733, Resentencing exhibits 39, 40, FF.) Because the information 
underlying the pleadings was provided to Dunlap's attorneys, he "bears the responsibility for his 
failure to investigate diligently." Pondexter v. Quarterman, 537 F.3d 511, 526 (5 th Cir. 2008); 
see also Rhoades v. Henry, 598 F.3d 495, 502 (9th Cir. 2010) ("no Brady violation occurs when a 
defendant possessed the information that he claims was withheld"); Raley v. Ylst, 444 F.3d 
1085, 1095 (9th Cir. 2006) (when a defendant possesses "the salient facts regarding the existence 
of the [evidence] that he claims [was] withheld," there is no Brady violation). 
The state recognizes "Brady is an obligation of not just the individual prosecutor assigned 
to the case, but of all the government agents having a significant role in investigating and 
prosecuting the offense." State v. Gardner, 126 Idaho 428, 433, 885 P.2d 1144 (Ct. App. 1994); 
see also Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437 ("the individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable 
evidence known to others acting on the government's behalf in the case, including the police"). 
However, "a prosecutor is not required to disclose evidence the prosecutor does not possess or 
evidence of which the prosecutor could not reasonably be imputed to have knowledge or 
control." State v. Avelar, 132 Idaho 775, 781, 979 P.2d 648 (1999) (quotes and citation 
omitted). Dr. Sombke and Fisher were merely witnesses who had information regarding 
Dunlap's mental health while incarcerated at IMSI. Because neither Dr. Sombke nor Fisher were 
acting on the state's behalf in investigating and prosecuting the underlying resentencing, their 
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opinions cannot be imputed to the prosecutor. See Queen v. State, 146 Idaho S02, 198 P.3d 731, 
. 733 (Ct. App. 2008) (because the record did not reflect the FBI played any role in investigating 
or prosecuting Queen, the state was not required to disclose a witness' prior felony record 
available on the NCIC database). 
Finally, Dunlap has failed to establish a reasonable probability his sentence would have 
been different even if the information from the pleadings could have been revealed earlier. Dr. 
Cunningham testified extensively regarding whether Dunlap was mimicking others on death row, 
opined he was not malingering (#32773 Tr.Vol.IX, pp.131-37) and explained why prior records 
that he was "manipulative" did not establish he was malingering (id., pp.1S0-S2). Dr. Beaver 
testified regarding Dunlap's mental health history" including his prior work with Dunlap (id. 
VoLXI, pp.13-2S), and explained the importance of ascertaining whether he was malingering 
based upon testing and his history (id., pp.2S-26), which were all reviewed by Dr. Beaver (id., 
pp.14-1S). Dr. Beaver conceded, "just because you have a psychiatric condition, doesn't mean 
that you are not going to also exaggerate or fake some of your psychiatric problems when you 
think it might be to your advantage. I think Tim Dunlap has done that as welL" (Id. at p.43.) 
Dr. Beaver also opined, "Tim at times exaggerates his symptoms, you know, over-states them. 
Has done that at times on some of the psychological testing. He has done that at times when he 
thought it would be helpful for him within the correctional jail system." (Id., p.44.) Dr. Beaver 
explained he was not surprised by Dr. Sombke's notes that Dunlap had said he was faking 
mental illness because "Mr. Dunlap has done that several times during his history." (ld., p.136.) 
D. The Civil Rights Pleadings Do Not Violate Napue 
In Napue, 360 U.S. at 269, the Supreme Court explained the state cannot obtain a 
conviction through the use of evidence known to the state to be false. "The same result obtains 
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when the State, although not soliciting false evidence, allows it to go uncorrected when it 
appears." Id. Materiality is based upon "the well-established rule that a conviction obtained by 
the knowing use of perjured testimony is fundamentally unfair, and must be set aside if there is 
any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury." 
Sivak v. State, 134 Idaho 641, 649, 8 P.3d 636 (2000) (emphasis in original) (quotes and citation 
omitted). "This standard is a strict standard of materiality not just because [these cases] involve 
prosecutorial misconduct, but more importantly because they involve a corruption of the truth-
seeking function of the trial process." Paradis v. State, 110 Idaho 534, 538, 716 P.2d 1306 
(1986) (quotes and citation omitted). 
Dunlap's claim is premised upon the contention the prosecutors and Dr. Matthews were 
aware Dr. Sombke allegedly did not believe Dunlap was malingering and the prosecutors did 
nothing to correct Dr. Matthews' testimony to the contrary. Dunlap's claim is flawed on a 
number of bases. First, irrespective of Dr. Sombke's subsequent opinions, there is no evidence 
establishing Dr. Matthews' testimony was false. As noted in Ake, 470 U.S. 80, "Psychiatry is 
not ... an exact science and psychiatrists disagree widely and frequently on what constitutes 
mental illness, on the appropriate diagnosis to be attached to given behavior and symptoms, 
[and] on cure and treatment." Merely because Dr. Matthews - who reviewed the records from 
IMSI and Dunlap's prior hospitalizations - had a different opinion than Dr. Sombke does not 
mean he testified falsely. Second, there is no evidence establishing the prosecutors were aware 
of Dr. Sombke' s opinions regarding Dunlap being a malingerer. Dr. Sombke was not a member 
of the state's "team" in the criminal prosecution, but merely a witness in the federal civil rights 
case. Not only has Dunlap failed to establish the prosecutor was aware of Sombke's subsequent 
opinions, he has failed to establish the prosecutor was aware Dr. Matthews was allegedly 
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testifying falsely. See Ellington, 253 P.3d at 750 ("We have no way to know whether or not the 
prosecutor had any knowledge of the falsity of [the witness'] testimony"). Finally, Dunlap has 
failed to establish there is any reasonable likelihood that Dr. Matthews' allegedly false testimony 
could have affected the judgment of the jury. As detailed above, the question of malingering was 
. extensively discussed by Dr. Beaver and Dr. Cunningham. 
XX. 
Dunlap Has Failed To Establish The Court Erred By Summarily Dismissing His Claims 
Regarding Alleged Juror Use Of Extrinsic Evidence And Juror Bias 
A. Introduction And Relevant Facts 
Dunlap contends the district court erred by summarily dismissing his claim that the jury 
"may have consulted a dictionary during deliberations." (Brief, p.70.) The claim is based upon 
the unsigned affidavit of juror Corey Kunz attached to the affidavit of State Appellate Public 
Defender ("SAPD") Investigator, Michael Jay Shaw, who contends he spoke with Kunz who 
stated, "During deliberations, one of the jurors had a question involving a definition. I recall that 
they either brought us a dictionary or asked us if we wanted one." (#37270 R., p.l094, attach. 
18.) The court rejected the claim because "[t]here is no affidavit that says that they had a 
dictionary delivered or they relied on any definition from a dictionary. There is no showing from 
the information or affidavit that this affected the jury's decision at all." (#32720 R., p.1955.) 
Dunlap also contends the district court erred by dismissing his claim that the jury was 
biased based upon a statement allegedly made by alternate juror Forest Hansen. (Brief, p.70.) 
The entirety of the claim is based upon alternate juror Chad Neibaur's affidavit, who contends 
Hansen "did express his opinion about wanting to deliberate and 'hang' Mr. Dunlap but was not 
given the opportunity." (#37270 R., p.1094, attach. 19.) The court dismissed this claim because 
both jurors were alternates and did not participate in deliberations. (#32720, R., p.1955.) 
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Because these claims are not supported by admissible evidence, the court appropriately 
dismissed them without an evidentiary hearing. Even if the affidavits were admissible, they are 
. insufficient to establish a constitutional violation or warrant an evidentiary hearing. 6 
B. Standard Of Review 
Because this is a post-conviction claim, the state incorporates the standard of review 
detailed in section XIX(B) above. 
C. Alleged Use Of A Dictionary 
Kunz's affidavit is not admissible because it is neither signed nor notarized. Shaw's 
affidavit is not admissible because it is nothing more than hearsay. Because the affidavits are 
inadmissible, they are insufficient to support Dunlap's claim. Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 794-95; 
State v. Kellogg, 100 Idaho 483, 489, 600 P.2d 787 (1979). 
Even if the affidavits were admissible, they do not establish the jury impermissibly relied 
upon extrinsic evidence. While juries are required to render their verdicts based upon evidence 
presented in court, Turner v. Louisiana, 376 U.S. 466, 472-73 (1965), contrary to Dunlap's 
. contention, there is not a rebuttable presumption of prejudice that arises if a jury is exposed to 
external information. "Absent proof of jury misconduct in following the court's directives, we 
will not presume error. To show that the closer examination of [a dictionary] by the jury was 
error in this case, [Dunlap] must demonstrate prejudice from the alleged error, consistent with 
the principles of appeal and error." State v. Fairchild, 121 Idaho 960, 969, 829 P.2d 550 (Ct. 
App. 1992). "[The] inquiry is fact-specific. It requires a reviewing court to determine whether 
the particular materials that a juror brought into the jury room are extraneous materials, or are 
merely the kind of common knowledge which most jurors are presumed to possess." Fields v. 
6 Dunlap also relies upon John Sullivan's affidavit (Brief, p.70), but there is nothing in that 
affidavit to support this claim (#37270 R., p.l 094, attach. 20). 
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. Brown, 431 F.3d 1186,1208 (9th Cir. 2005) (quotes and citation omitted). In U.S. v. Steele, 785 
F.2d 743, 746 (9th Cir. 1986), the court concluded, 'jurors' improper use of the dictionary to 
determine the precise definition of several words does not require reversal unless there is a 
reasonable possibility that the extrinsic material could have affected the verdict." 
Dunlap's claim fails because Kunz's unsigned affidavit is insufficient to establish juror 
misconduct. There is no evidence establishing which juror had a question, who "they" is, what 
needed defining, whether the dictionary was actually brought into the room, or, if it was, whether 
or when it was examined. Merely because a dictionary may have been present in the jury room 
. does not establish the jury's verdict was based upon extrinsic information not presented in the 
courtroom or that it was prejudicial. See Marino v. Vasquez, 812 F.2d 499,505 (9th Cir. 1987) 
("Not all instances of juror misconduct will necessarily lead to reversal"). Dunlap simply failed 
to present sufficient evidence establishing the incident actually occurred, let alone that the 
dictionary actually affected the jury's verdict. 
D. Remarks By Alternate Juror 
Dunlap's claim regarding Hansen's alleged statement is likewise unavailing because it is 
based upon inadmissible hearsay and is insufficient to establish a constitutional violation. While 
the affidavit states, "many jurors expressed their opinions outside in the hallway while we waited 
to be called for individual questioning," there is no indication when Hansen allegedly made his 
statement. (#37270 R. p.1094, attach. 19.) Since Hansen "was not given the opportunity" to 
deliberate, it is probable the statement was made after presentation of the evidence when he may 
well have wanted to "deliberate and 'hang'" Dunlap. 
Even if this Court were to otherwise interpret Hansen's affidavit, Dunlap's claim fails 
because this Court has recognized, "'To hold that the mere existence of any preconceived notion 
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as to the guilt or innocence of an accused, without more, is sufficient to rebut the presumption of 
a prospective juror's impartiality would be to establish an impossible standard. It is sufficient if 
. the juror can lay aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence 
presented in court.'" State v. Yager, 139 Idaho 680, 688, 85 P.3d 656 (2004) (quoting Murphy v. 
Florida, 421 U.S. 794,800 (1975)). In State v. Kilby, 130 Idaho 747, 751, 947 P.2d 420 (Ct. 
App. 1997), the court did not apply a presumption of prejudice when a prospective juror 
commented in a child sex abuse case that the defendant was a pedophile. See also Goss v. 
Nelson, 439 F.3d 621, 634 (loth Cir. 2006) ("even if the process exposed the jury to the opinions 
of others, Goss, who bears the burden, has made no showing of disqualifying prejudice"); State 
v. Brazzell, 118 Idaho 431, 436, 797 P.2d 139 (Ct. App. 1990) (affirming the denial of motion 
for new trial based upon comments regarding news coverage made by juror who was 
subsequently excused). Finally, Dunlap's reliance upon Holland v. State, 588 So. 543, 548-49 
(Ala. 1991) ("some veniremember comments are so inherently prejudicial as to be 
ineradicable"), is misplaced because the Alabama courts concluded the phrase, "I think 
[appellant] should have already been hung," is not such a comment. Id. at 547 (quote and 
citation omitted). Because Hansen's alleged statement is not inherently prejudicial and the 
remaining jurors agreed to lay aside any preconceived impressions or opinions and render a 
verdict on the evidence presented in court, the district court did not err by dismissing this claim. 
XXI. 
Dunlap Has Failed To Establish His Attorneys' Performances Were Unreasonable And That Any 
Alleged Deficiency Would Have Changed The Outcome 
A. Introduction 
Dunlap has raised a plethora of lAC claims, several of which are contained within direct 
review claims. The state hereby incorporates its arguments above with respect to those claims in 
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which Dunlap included an lAC claim with a direct review claim. Additionally, because Dunlap 
has failed to establish deficient performance and prejudice, each of his lAC claims fail. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of review for post-conviction claims is discussed in section XIX(B) above. 
C. Standards Of Law Regarding Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel 
The unwavering standard in determining whether counsel has provided effective 
assistance of counsel remains the test articulated in Strickland. Shackelford, 150 Idaho at 609. 
The purpose of effective assistance of counsel "is not to improve on the quality of legal 
representation ... [but] simply to ensure that criminal defendants receive a fair trial." Cullen v. 
Pinholster, --- U.S. ---,131 S.Ct. 1388, 1403 (2011) (quotes and citation omitted). To prevail on 
a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Dunlap must show his counsels' representation was 
deficient and that the deficiency was prejudicial. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. 
The first element "requires a showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel 
was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Id. In 
making this determination, there is a strong presumption that counsel's performance fell within 
the "wide range of professional assistance." Id. at 689. Dunlap has the burden of showing 
counsel's perfonnance "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." Id. at 688. The 
effectiveness of counsel's performance must be evaluated from his perspective at the time of the 
alleged error, not with twenty-twenty hindsight. rd. at 689. "Unlike a later reviewing court, the 
attorney observed the relevant proceedings, knew of materials outside the record, and interacted 
with the client, with opposing counsel, and with the judge." Harrington v. Richter, --- U.S. m, 
131 S.Ct. 770, 788 (2011) (quotes and citation omitted). "There are countless ways to provide 
effective assistance in any given case. Even the best criminal defense attorneys would not 
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defend a particular client in the same way." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. "The question is 
whether an attorney's representation amounted to incompetence under prevailing professional 
norms, not whether it deviated from best practices or most common custom." Richter, 131 S.Ct. 
at 788 (quotes and citation omitted). 
Strategic and tactical choices are "virtually unchallengeable" if made after thorough 
investigation of the law and facts. Strickland, 466 u.s. at 690-91. Strategic choices made after 
less than complete investigation are unchallengeable if "reasonable professional judgments 
support the limitations on investigation." Id. "Rare are the situations in which the wide latitude 
counsel must have in making tactical decisions will be limited to anyone technique or 
approach." Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 789 (quotes and citation omitted). Counsel can develop a 
strategy that was reasonable at the time and "balance limited resources in accord with effective 
trial tactics and strategies." Id. 
The second element requires Dunlap show "counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive 
the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. This 
requires Dunlap to demonstrate "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional 
errors the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a 
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome," id. at 694, which "requires a 
substantial, not just conceivable, likelihood of a different result," Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. at 1403 
(quotes and citation omitted). In making such a determination, the reviewing court "must 
consider the totality of the evidence before the judge or jury." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695. 
Overcoming Strickland's "high bar is never an easy task." Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 
130 S.Ct. 1473, 1485 (2010). Because ineffective assistance of counsel claims provide a 
means to raise issues not presented at trial, the Strickland standard "must be applied with 
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scrupulous care, lest intrusive post-trial inquiry threaten the integrity of the very adversary 
process the right to counsel is meant to serve." Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 788 (quotes and citation 
omitted). The reviewing court need not address both prongs of Strickland if an insufficient 
showing is made under only one prong. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. 
D. The Court's Five Minute Limitation For Individual Voir Dire 
Coupled with his contention the district court abused its discretion by limiting individual 
voir dire to five minutes, Dunlap contends counsel were ineffective by allegedly failing to object 
to the court's five minute limitation. (Brief, pp.8-9.) The court rejected this claim, explaining, 
"it was the court's decision to permit individual voir dire not the decision of either attorney. The 
remainder of Dunlap's objections to counsels' efforts on voir dire are without merit, involving 
strategy on the part of defense counsel." (#37270 R., p.1953.) In addition to the arguments in 
section I above, Dunlap has failed to establish both Strickland prongs. 
Counsel filed a motion for individual voir dire (#32773 R., pp.504-07), which the district 
court denied (#32773 Tr.l-6-06, ppA-15.) After the state filed its motion (#32773 R., pp.570-
74), the court reconsidered its decision and permitted the parties five minutes of individual voir 
dire, in addition to the extensive jury questionnaire (#32773 R., p.731, exhibit 0) and general voir 
dire (#32773 Tr. 2-2-06, pp.1-6). Dunlap's attorneys, having their motion for individual voir 
dire denied, were undoubtedly satisfied the court gave them five minutes of individual voir dire. 
Moreover, counsel is not mandated to object when it is bclieved the objection will be overruled. 
As explained in Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. Ill, ---, 129 S.Ct. 1411, 1419 (2009), the 
Supreme Court has never adopted a '''nothing to lose' standard for evaluating Strickland claims." 
In Lowry, 21 F.3d at 346, the Ninth Circuit explained: 
The defendant stands to lose two things of value - a significant quantity of his lawyer's 
scarce time, and some of his lawyer's credibility with the judge. Lawyers are not called 
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"counsel" for nothing. The judge is counseled by the lawyers as to how he should 
proceed. The attentiveness with which the judge listens to the lawyers' advice is 
tempered by his judgment about the credibility of the particular lawyer. An 
unmeritorious motion to suppress may cost the particular defendant some deference by 
the judge to his lawyer's advice on other issues later in the case. It will certainly cost the 
particular defendant the time his lawyer wastes in the library and at his desk generating 
valueless paper, when he could be working on better motions, interviewing witnesses, 
examining locations and evidence, researching likely evidentiary issues, and preparing 
for trial. 
Finally, based upon the extensive jury questionnaire, general voir dire, and the five 
minutes of individual voir dire, Dunlap has failed to explain how further argument or objection 
regarding individual voir dire would have changed the district court's decision or the outcome of 
his resentencing, particularly when individual voir dire is not constitutionally mandated. 
E. Redacting Information Regarding The Previous Idaho Death Sentence 
Coupled with his contention that the jurors' knowledge he had been sentenced to death in 
Idaho violates the Eighth Amendment, Dunlap contends counsel were ineffective by failing to 
redact Dr. Cunningham'S testimony referencing Dunlap being on death row and making no effort 
. to determine if potential jurors knew of his prior death sentence in this case. (Brief, pp.19-21.) 
The district court rejected this claim, explaining there was no prejudice and that it "may have 
been important to Dr. Cunningham's point of view to refer to Mr. Dunlap being on death row to 
present his overall point." (#37270 R., p.1958.) The state incorporates its arguments in section 
IV above establishing Dunlap has failed to establish deficient performance or prejudice. 
Moreover, assuming Dunlap is correct and as a result of Dr. Cunningham's testimony the 
jury knew Dunlap had been previously sentenced to death in this case, based upon the tactical 
decisions counsel made regarding the use of prison records and Dunlap's malingering, it was 
unavoidable the jury would learn Dunlap had been in prison, was on death row for some crime, 
and, after having that death sentence reversed, miraculously recovered from his alleged mental 
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illnesses. Those tactical decisions simply cannot be second-guessed on appeal, particularly since 
Dunlap has failed to establish they were the result of inadequate investigation or preparation. 
Additionally, Dunlap's contention that counsel "made no effort to find out if other 
potential jurors knew of Mr. Dunlap's prior death sentence in this case" (Brief, p.20) (emphasis 
omitted) is without merit. The jury questionnaire expressly asked the following questions: (1) 
"Have you heard anything about this case from any source;" (2) "what have you heard;" (3) 
"What have you heard or what do you know about the Defendant, Timothy Alan Dunlap;" (4) 
"Are you acquainted with the Defendant, Timothy Alan Dunlap;" (5) "please describe how you 
know [Dunlap] and the nature of your relationship;" (6) "What do you know about him;" (7) 
"Could your knowledge of Timothy Alan Dunlap prevent you from acting impartially in this 
case;" and (8) "Have you read or heard anything about this case?" (#37270 R., p.1732, 
Appendix A.) Further, during voir dire the district court advised the panel Dunlap had pled 
guilty to first-degree murder and then asked, "Other than what I have told you, do any of you 
know anything about this case, either through your own personal knowledge, by discussion with 
anyone else or from radio, television or newspaper." (#32773 Tr.Vol.I, p.9.) The court asked 
follow-up questions of the veniremen, some of whom noted they knew of Dunlap's case, 
resulting in the recusal of two veniremen. (Id., pp.lO-34.) The questionnaire and court questions 
with follow-up encompassed the veniremen's knowledge of prior proceedings, including the 
prior death sentence. Undoubtedly, counsel made the tactical decision to use their five minutes 
of voir dire in a more productive manner, not asking questions regarding a subject already 
covered. Further, in light of the questions asked in the questionnaire and by the district court, 
Dunlap has failed to establish the outcome of his sentence would have been different if counsel 
had used their five minutes in a different manner or additional questioning had been permitted. 
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F. Not Questioning A Juror Allegedly Seen Talking On A Phone 
Coupled with his due process claim that the district court should have interviewed the 
juror allegedly seen by Dahms talking on the telephone, Dunlap attempts to salvage his claim by 
contending counsel were ineffective by "waiving questioning of the juror, failing to demand that 
an inquiry be conducted, and failing to ensure the in-chambers meeting was recorded." (Brief, 
p.37.) The court recognized this was a trial tactic that cannot be second-guessed on appeal. 
(#37270 R., p.1957.) In addition to the arguments in sections VIII and IX above, Dunlap has 
failed to establish both Strickland prongs. 
In addition to the record made at the time of the incident (#32773, Tr.Vol.XII, pp.88-90), 
Dunlap provided an affidavit from Dahms during post-conviction proceedings, which provided 
no more information than was provided at the time of the incident (#37270 R., p.1094, 
attach.25). Moreover, during his deposition, lead counsel David Parmenter reviewed the note 
and explained his tactical decision for not questioning the juror was based upon the belief that he 
"felt it cut in our favor and I did not want to do anything to upset or, you know, cause any 
concern to the prospective juror. ... I am sure it's something that we discussed as a defense team 
whether or not we wanted to follow up with that or not. And apparently the consensus was not." 
(#327270, p.1094, attach.2, pp.190-91.) This reasoning was confirmed by co-counsel James 
Archibald, who explained, "it seems like the note was in our favor. That the witness may have 
been sinical [sic] of something that the state was saying." (Id., attach.3, p.152.) 
This was a tactical decision that cannot be second-guessed years later on appeal. 
. Additionally, Dunlap's contention that he has established prejudice merely because the juror was 
allegedly "talking about the case just prior to or during deliberations" (Brief, p.37) is contrary to 
the prejudice prong under Strickland, which requires he establish "a reasonable probability that, 
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but for counsel's [failure to have the juror questioned] the result of the [sentencing] would have 
been different," Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; this involves "a substantial, not just conceivable, 
likelihood of a different result," Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. at 1403, a burden Dunlap has not met. 
This analysis is true with regard to Dunlap's contention counsel were ineffective by not 
having the Dahms' chamber conversation recorded. Even if counsel were deficient, Dunlap has 
failed to establish how the outcome would have been different, particularly since Dahms' 
affidavit confirms the record that was created after the conference. 
G. Reports And Information From Doten, Dr. Estess, And Dr. Brooks 
Attempting to salvage his direct appeal claims regarding the reports of Doten, Dr. Estess, 
and Dr. Brooks, Dunlap contends counsel were ineffective in preventing the admission of the 
reports or information therein. (Brief, pp.44-50.) Because of the overwhelming nature of the 
state's evidence and recognizing Dunlap's claim is not supported by the law, the district court 
rejected his Confrontation Clause claim. (#372270 R., p.2002.) The court also rejected 
Dunlap's Fifth Amendment claim because counsel made a tactical decision to rely upon the 
information contained in Brooks and Estess' reports, particularly in closing argument, and failed 
to establish prejudice. (Id., pp.l999-2001.) In addition to the arguments in section XIV above, 
Dunlap has failed to establish both Strickland prongs. 
Based upon the arguments detailed in section XIV(C) regarding Dunlap's Confrontation 
Clause claim, the contention that counsel should have objected to Doten and Brooks' reports 
must be rejected because counsel are not expected to "argue for a novel theory in an undeveloped 
area of law." Piro v. State, 146 Idaho 86, 92, 190 P.3d 905 (Ct. App. 2008); see also Schoger v. 
State, 148 Idaho 622, ---, 226 P.3d 1269, 1277 (2010). Based upon the status of the law in Idaho 
at the time of the resentencing, counsels' decision to not object based upon the Confrontation 
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Clause at a capital sentencing cannot constitute deficient performance. Moreover, contrary to his 
contention that merely because the "documents contributed to the jury's verdict" (Brief, p.SO), 
Dunlap has failed to establish "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's [failure to object 
under the Confrontation Clause] the result of the [sentencing] would have been different," 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, particularly in light of the overwhelming evidence of aggravation 
presented by the state and the de minimus roll of the reports at the resentencing. 
Dunlap's claim regarding Drs. Brooks and Estess is particularly troubling because of its 
disingenuous nature. In his amended post-conviction petition, Dunlap first contended counsel 
were ineffective by failing to "adequately" argue for the admission of Dr. Estess' treatment notes 
(#37270 R., pp.1023-24), but later contended (and now contends) counsel were ineffective by 
failing to prevent portions of Dr. Estess' report from being admitted through Dr. Roderick 
Pettis, and Dr. Brooks' report through Dr. Matthews (id., pp.l 074-78). This establishes why 
tactical decisions of trial attorneys cannot be second-guessed years later; they are "damned if 
they do and damned if they don't." 
Dunlap has not established these tactical decisions were made without the benefit of 
adequate investigation. In fact, based upon counsels' desire to have this information admitted 
during the early portions of the case, it is entirely probable their failure to object to the admission 
of this information was a way of obtaining their goal irrespective of the district court's decision. 
Finally, based upon the de minimus nature of Dr. Brooks' report and the snippets from Dr. 
Estess' report contained in Dr. Pettis' affidavit, coupled with the overwhelming evidence of 
aggravation, particularly from other records demonstrating Dunlap is a malingerer and Dr. 
Matthews' testimony, Dunlap has failed to establish the outcome would have been different if 
the information had not been presented to the jury. 
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H. Allegedly Failing To "Adequately" Challenge Venue 
Dunlap contends counsel were ineffective because they failed to submit sufficient 
evidence supporting their change of venue motion and failed to renew the change of venue 
motion after completed questionnaires were received from the veniremen. (Brief, pp.66-69.) 
The district court denied this claim, concluding it was a tactical decision not to renew the change 
of venue motion because "it was apparent to all involved in the process that a fair and impartial 
jury was seated in Caribou County," "[t]here was no basis to show that any of the fifteen jurors 
were prejudiced or biased against Mr. Dunlap," and "it would not have made a difference as is 
required in the Strickland v. Washington case." (#37270 R., pp.149-51.) 
Dunlap filed a pro se letter requesting a change of venue. (#32773 R., p.206.) Counsel 
later filed a supporting memorandum but did not file supporting affidavits. (Id., p.301.) The 
district court denied the motion "at this time," stating it would "go ahead with a questionnaire in 
an attempt to seat a jury in Caribou County. At the time we do that, the Court would entertain 
another motion for change of venue, if it becomes apparent in the process of trying to seat a jury 
that we could not do so." (#32773 Tr. 7-29-05, p.6.) After reviewing the questionnaires, the 
parties stipulated to excuse fifty-six veniremen based upon their questionnaires. (#32773 Tr. 1-
6-06, pp.38-40.) Later, the parties reviewed requests to be excused and stipulated to excuse four 
additional veniremen. (#32773 Tr. 1-24-06, pp.2-13.) Three more were excused during a 
subsequent hearing. (#32773 R., p.602.) Voir dire commenced with the clerk initially selecting 
thirty-nine veniremen for questioning (#32773 Tr.Vol.I, pp.5-7), after which the court asked 
them general voir dire questions (id., pp.9-69), resulting in four being excused: two because of 
bias (id., pp.15-17, 19-20), one because of a planned vacation (id., pp.56-57), and one because of 
school (id., pp.60-61). Individual voir dire resulted in nine being excused (#32773 Tr.Vol.III, 
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·. p.75): seven for bias based upon Dunlap's motion (#32773 Tr.Vol.II, pp.82-88, 114-20, 176-79; 
Vol.III, pp.21-28, 39-44, 50-54, 59-64), one for bias based upon the state's motion (Vol.lI, 
pp.l41-45), and one for other reasons (VoLIlI, pp.l0-17). Nine additional veniremen were 
called and questioned by the court. (Id., pp.79-93.) During individual voir dire the court granted 
. the state's motion to excuse one for bias (id., pp.122-25), one for other reasons (id., pp.125-32), 
and, based upon Dunlap's motion, another based upon bias (id., pp.166-71). After the parties 
exercised their preemptory challenges, twelve jurors were seated with three alternates. (Id., 
pp.187-89.) Both parties stipulated to the seating of the fifteen jurors. (Id., p.188.) 
Dunlap then filed a pro se Motion to Recuse Judge Harding, contending he was biased 
"due to refusing to change venue." (#32773 R., p.634.) Counsel contended, "Regardless of the 
fact that we now have picked a jury, I think the potential prejudice, the potential bias, is still 
there and underlies particularly in a community of this size." (#32773 Tr.Vol.V, p.2.) The court 
denied the motion, explaining: 
This motion was made earlier in the trial. At that time, I denied it to see if a jury 
could be impaneled here. And in getting a jury, I might note that all of these 15 
jurors was [sic] passed by both sides for cause. Everyone of the jurors that are 
sitting here in this jury were passed by both the State and by the defendants [ sic] 
for cause. Several of the jurors -- ten of the 15, were not living here when this 
happened. One is 19 now and so was 5 years old when this happened. And I 
believe that we do have a good jury and so I don't believe changing the venue is 
even all issue at this point, and I \~vould assure i'Ar. Dunlap that I a'll detennined to 
give you a fair trial in this case. 
(Id., p.3.) 
Conspicuously absent from Dunlap's brief is any authority explaining when a motion for 
change of venue should be granted. While the right to an impartial jury is encompassed within 
the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 
(1966), the Supreme Court has not articulated minimum due process requirements for 
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determining when to grant a motion to change venue. See Swindler v. Lockhart, 495 U.S. 911 
(1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari and noting the need for the Court to 
"provide much needed guidance regarding the minimal due process requirements for state 
change of venue rules"). Rather, the Court has only indicated precautions must be taken against 
the influence of media publicity and there must be some process to identify biased veniremen 
and exclude those who demonstrate an inability to be impartial. Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 
1031-35 (1984). "Error in regard to a trial court's denial ofa motion for change of venue cannot 
be predicated on the mere existence of pretrial publicity concerning a criminal case." State v. 
Custodio, 136 Idaho 197,202,30 P.3d 975 (Ct. App. 2001). In Hairston, 133 Idaho at 506, the 
Idaho Supreme Court explained, "The trial court does not need to find jurors that are entirely 
ignorant of the facts and issues involved in the case." As explained in Murphy, 421 U.S. at 800: 
To hold that the mere existence of any preconceived notion as to the guilt or 
innocence of an accused, without more, is sufficient to rebut the presumption of a 
prospective juror's impartiality would be to establish an impossible standard. It is 
sufficient if the juror can lay aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict 
based on the evidence presented in court. 
Idaho has consistently recognized the decision whether to seek a change of venue is a 
trial strategy. In Mitchell v. State, 132 Idaho 274, 279, 971 P.2d 727 (1998), this Court, after 
reiterating that pretrial publicity alone does not result in a denial of constitutional rights, 
explained, "Trial counsel's decision to address the publicity issue by individual voir dire was 
based on a rational trial strategy, and his tactical decisions will not be second-guessed on 
review." See also State v. Fee, 124 Idaho 170, 175, 857 P.2d 649 (Ct. App. 1993) ("It further 
has been held that the issue of whether a change of venue should be requested is a matter of trial 
strategy and tactical choice, not subject to review as a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 
in the absence of proof of inadequate preparation or ignorance on counsel's part"). This basic 
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principle was applied in Porter, 130 Idaho at 792, a capital case in a small community, with this 
Court concluding, "this Court will not second-guess trial strategy." 
Dunlap has failed to establish counsels' decisions regarding changing venue were 
anything but tactical, particularly based upon the district court's earlier decision, the answers 
received during voir dire, the court's conclusion after jury selection that changing venue was not 
an issue, and the requirement that, "[w]hen counsel focuses on some issues to the exclusion of 
others, there is a strong presumption that he or she did so for tactical reasons rather than through 
sheer neglect." Suits v. State, 143 Idaho 160, 164, 139 P.3d 762 (Ct. App. 2006) (citing 
Yarbourough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 8 (2003)). Despite Parmenter's argument regarding 
Dunlap's pro se motion after jury selection, he merely discussed "potential prejudice" and 
"potential bias," never stating prejudice should be presumed or that the chosen jury was actually 
biased. (#32773 Tr.Vo1.V, p.2.) Further, during his deposition Parmenter expressly stated the 
issue of renewing the change of venue motion was considered, but he recognized the futility of 
filing the motion because the court would have denied it; he also explained, after reviewing the 
questionnaires and removing the initial group of prospective jurors, "I thought we were working 
with, you know, a fairly open-minded bunch." (#37270, p.1094, attach. 2, pp.134-36.) 
Dunlap has also failed to establish prejudice. Based upon the district court's rulings, both 
prior to and after voir dire, a motion to change venue would not have been granted because a fair 
and impartial jury had been chosen. As explained in Meeks v. Moore, 216 F.3d 951, 961 (8th 
Cir. 2000), prejudice requires, "at a minimum, that [Dunlap] bring forth evidence demonstrating 
that there is a reasonable probability that the trial court would have, or at least should have, 
granted a motion for change of venue if [Dunlap's] counsel had presented such a motion to the 
court." Further, as explained in Duff-Smith v. Collins, 973 F.2d 1175, 1183 (5 th Cir. 1992), 
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"After voir dire defense counsel was satisfied that Duff-Smith could receive a fair trial in Harris 
County. As there was neither a demonstration nor suggestion of prejudice, this cannot be 
deemed ineffective assistance of counsel." Because Parmenter testified the jury constituted "a 
fairly open-minded bunch" (#37270 R., p.1 094, attach. 2, pp.135), a conclusion clearly supported 
by the record, Dunlap's claim that he has established prejudice is without merit. 
I. Restraints And The Presence Of Law Enforcement In The Courtroom 
Dunlap contends counsel were ineffective for failing to object to the use of a leg brace 
during resentencing and "an overwhelming presence of security and law enforcement in the 
courtroom." (Brief, pp.70-74.) The district court denied this claim because, even if counsel had 
objected to use of the leg brace, it would have been overruled since having Dunlap shackled 
"was necessary for proper security and protection of individuals in the courtroom" as he had 
previously pled guilty to first-degree murder in Idaho and been found guilty of first-degree 
murder in Ohio and sentenced to death. (#37270 R., p.1958.) Rejecting Dunlap's claim 
regarding law enforcement, the court explained any objection would have been denied because 
"Dunlap should be considered dangerous" making the use of four police officers in the 
courtroom and the use of a metal detector appropriate under the circumstances. (rd.) 
In Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 626-31 (2005) (quotes and citations omitted), the 
Supreme Court explained the use of visible shackles during a trial violates due process unless the 
trial court determines they are "justified by a state interest specific to a particular trial," which 
includes "security problems and the risk of escape at trial." This principle was extended to 
capital sentencing hearings before a jury. Id. at 632-33. 
Contrary to Dunlap's contention (Brief, p.71), the brace was not "readily observable." 
While the record establishes Dunlap wore "leg braces" during the resentencing, counsel 
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explained there were curtains around the table where Dunlap was sitting and the braces could not 
be seen by the jury. For example, prior to Dunlap's allocution, the parties discussed how he 
would be seated at the witness stand with Parmenter stating, "I think he can walk slow enough 
. that shouldn't affect him too much." (#32773 Tr.Vol.XII, p.l.) Dunlap concurred, stating, "It 
only locks up if I try to run" and agreeing he was not "concerned about the jury noticing [he] 
may have some kind of restraints on." (Id., pp.I-2.) During his deposition, Archibald explained, 
"[Dunlap] had something that went from his hip to his ankle that would prevent him from 
running. That would lock up so to speak," which Archibald believed was under Dunlap's pants. 
(#37270 R., p.l094, attach.3, p.213.) While Archibald agreed Dunlap had "difficulty walking or 
kind of walk[ed] strangely with the brace on," he never testified the brace was "readily 
observable." Parmenter concurred, explaining, "Yeah. He could walk. And we had him 
covered up. So, you know, there is a curtain in front of counsels' table so that the jury could not 
tell ifhe was in shackles or not." (Id., attach.2, p.244.) 
Admittedly, in his affidavit alternate juror Neibaur stated, "Although the Court did try to 
hide the fact that Mr. Dunlap was in shackles, I could tell by his posture that he was somehow 
restrained." (Id., attach.19, p.2.) However, Neibaur fails to explain how Dunlap's posture 
indicated he was "restrained;" it is just as likely Dunlap simply had poor posture or a bad leg. 
Irrespective, because Neibaur was an alternate juror, even if he was aware Dunlap was 
"restrained" by leg braces, that knowledge had no effect on Dunlap's sentence. See State v. 
Miller, 131 Idaho 288, 293, 955 P.2d 603 (Ct. App. 1998) ("in order for the defendant to assert 
that he or she was prejudiced by the restraints, there must be some evidence that the jury saw the 
restraints and thereby drew a conclusion regarding the defendant's character"). 
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More importantly, based upon Dunlap's history of having pled guilty to first-degree 
murder in Idaho and being sentenced to death, coupled with his conviction for first-degree 
murder and a death sentence in Ohio, the district court explained even if counsel had objected to 
the use of the brace, the objection would have been overruled. (#37270 R., p.1658.) In Wells v. 
Campbell, 384 Fed. Appx. 634, 636 (9th Cir. 2010) (unpublished), the court explained, "given the 
severity of the offenses with which Wells was charged and given that Wells's leg brace was not 
visible to the jury," counsel were not ineffective in failing to object to shackling. See also U.S. 
v. Baker, 432 F.3d 1189,1244 (11 th Cir. 2004) (assessment of whether a defendant should be 
shackled may include "whether the defendant has a history of violent acts," and "the nature of 
the charges pending against the defendants, including whether the charged offenses include 
violent criminal conduct"). In fact, Archibald affirmed the issue of security was discussed and 
"that's how the judge wanted it." (#37270 R., p.1094, attach 3, p.214.) Counsel are not required 
to make motions they know are going to be rejected by the trial court. Therefore, Dunlap can 
establish neither deficient performance nor prejudice because even if counsel had not made a 
tactical decision not to object, the objection would have been properly overruled since the brace 
was "justified by a state interest specific to [Dunlap's] trial." Deck, 544 U.S. at 629. 
Relying upon Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560 (1986), Dunlap contends counsel were 
. ineffective for failing to object to "the overwhelming presence of security and law enforcement." 
(Brief, p.72.) This claim is without merit. First, unlike the issue regarding shackling, which was 
expressly extended to capital sentencing hearings before a jury in Deck, 544 U.S. at 632-33, 
Dunlap has failed to cite any authority extending Holbrook to capital sentencing hearings. 
Second, the parties discussed security and the district court made its decision based upon the 
unique circumstances of Dunlap's case (#37270 R., p.1094, attach. 3, p.214), which was 
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reaffirmed in the court's decision denying post-conviction relief (id., p.1958). Therefore, there 
was no deficient performance because counsel are not required to repeatedly seek 
reconsideration of prior court decisions. Third, as explained in Holbrook, 475 U.S. at 569 
(quotes and citations omitted), while "it is possible that the sight of a security force within the 
courtroom might under certain conditions create the impression in the minds of the jury that the 
defendant is dangerous or untrustworthy," there is not a "presumption that any use of identifiable 
security guards in the courtroom is inherently prejudicial." The Court concluded, "Even had the 
jurors been aware that the deployment of troopers was not common practice in Rhode Island, we 
cannot believe that the use of the four troopers tended to brand respondent in their eyes with an 
unmistakable mark of guilt." rd. at 570 (quotes, citations and footnote omitted). Therefore, even 
if Dunlap established four officers were present in the courtroom and it was "out of the ordinary 
in this courthouse," there was no constitutional violation. See also State v. Lankford, 113 Idaho 
688, 693, 747 P.2d 710 (1987) ("No error resulted from the fact that Lankford was guarded by 
law enforcement officers during his trial"). 
Neither can Dunlap establish prejudice, which reqUIres more than a constitutional 
. violation that is "inherently prejudicial and contributed to the jury's finding that Mr. Dunlap had 
a propensity to commit murder that constituted a continuing threat to society." (Brief, p.73.) 
Rather, Dunlap must establish "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's [failure to object 
to the brace and presence of law enforcement] the result of the [sentencing] would have been 
different," Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; this involves "a substantial, not just conceivable, 
likelihood of a different result," Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. at 1403. Dunlap has failed to meet this 
burden, particularly since he appears to contend these claims are limited to the jury's finding of 
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the propensity aggravator and two other aggravators were found and weighed individually 
against the collective mitigation. See Wood, 132 Idaho at 719-20; Hoffman, 236 F.3d at 541-42. 
J. Counsels' Investigation And Presentation Of Mitigation Evidence 
1. Introduction 
Dunlap contends counsel were ineffective in their investigation and presentation of 
mitigation evidence and failing to rebut the state's aggravation case. (Brief, pp.74-88.) The 
district court correctly rejected each of these contentions because of Dunlap's failure to establish 
deficient performance and prejudice. (#37270, R., pp.1991-96.) 
2. Standards Regarding Investigation And Presentation Of Mitigation 
In Strickland, the Court also discussed counsels' duty to conduct a reasonable 
investigation, explaining, "counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a 
reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary. In any ineffectiveness 
case, a particular decision not to investigate must be directly assessed for reasonableness in all 
the circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel's judgments." In Burger v. 
Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 794 (1987) (quote and citation omitted), the Court explained, merely 
because counsel "could ... have made a more thorough investigation than he did," does not 
mandate relief because the courts "address not what is prudent or appropriate, but only what is 
constitutionally compelled." As explained in State v. Row, 131 Idaho 303,313,955 P.2d 1082 
(1998), "Counsel was not required to investigate Row's entire life in order to objectively and 
reasonably present Row's mitigation evidence. Trial counsel's decisions concerning Row's 
mental health and her allocution statement were strictly strategic and shall not be second-guessed 
by this Court." See also Babbitt v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 1170,1173-74 (9th Cir. 1998) (quote and 
citation omitted) ("While a lawyer is under a duty to make reasonable investigations, a lawyer 
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may make a reasonable decision that particular investigations are unnecessary. To determine the 
reasonableness of a decision not to investigate, the court must apply a heavy measure of 
deference to counsel's judgments"); Sims v. Singletary, 155 F.3d 1297, 1318 (11 th Cir. 1998) 
("A defense attorney has limited resources and must make the best decisions possible regarding 
allocating resources based upon his or her knowledge and experience,,).7 
3. Investigation Of Dunlap's Family And Background 
Dunlap contends counsel were ineffective by failing to locate and interview various 
acquaintances, classmates, teachers, friends, and family members who could have testified 
regarding his behavior and mental health from grade school through his marriage to Jennifer 
Robinette. (Brief, pp.75-77.) During post-conviction proceedings, additional information 
regarding Dunlap'S background was uncovered. However, Dunlap fails to recognize the 
constraints placed upon trial counsel who do not have the benefit of unlimited time and 
resources. As explained in Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 383 (2005), "the duty to investigate 
does not force defense lawyers to scour the globe on the off chance something will turn up; 
reasonably diligent counsel may draw a line when they have good reason to think further 
investigation would be a waste." See also Row, 131 Idaho at 313. 
Parmenter was appointed June 3, 2005, and resentencing was set to commence November 
1, 2005. (#32773 R., pp.209-11.) Mitigation specialist Roseanne Dapsauski was appointed 
October 3, 2005 (id., pp.344-45), resulting in a continuance of the resentencing to February 6, 
7 Dunlap's reliance upon ABA Guidelines is misplaced. As explained in Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. at 
1406 (quotes and citations omitted), "Beyond the general requirement of reasonableness, specific 
guidelines are not appropriate. No particular set of detailed rules for counsel's conduct can 
satisfactorily take account of the variety of circumstances faced by defense counselor the range 
of legitimate decisions." See also Porter, 130 Idaho at 782 (this Court has declined the 
"invitation to adopt these guidelines"). 
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2006 (id., pp.314-16). Dapsauski was limited to $37,000, plus $3,500 for related costs. (Id., 
p.344.) In contrast, the SAPD was appointed March 16, 2006 (id., pp.724-26) and took more 
than two years with state resources to investigate Dunlap's history before filing a 341-page Final 
Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief (#37270 R., pp.751-1093). Based upon the 
mitigation previously completed (id., p.l094, attach 17, p.2 ("some of the mitigation 
investigation had been done prior to [Dapsauski's] appointment to the resentencing"», and the 
additional mitigation completed prior to resentencing, Dunlap has failed to rebut the presumption 
that counsel made a strategic decision to rely upon what had been completed, particularly since 
the information obtained by the SAPD during post-conviction proceedings is cumulative. 
Dunlap filed a number of affidavits from individuals who would have testified regarding 
"[his] odd or bizarre behavior from grade school through high school" and who had contact with 
him "after high school [and] could have attested to his odd, bizarre behavior and flat affect." 
(Brief, p.75.) However, Dunlap's behavior during this time was presented to the jury. Terry 
Klem, Dunlap's first grade teacher, testified regarding the difficult time Dunlap had during first 
grade. (#32773 Tr.Vol.VIII, pp.34-37.) Dunlap's brother, Mark Dunlap, testified regarding 
Dunlap's bizarre behavior while growing up and after high school, including his marriage to 
Robinette and the interaction Dunlap had with his son, Andrew. (Id., Vol.X, pp.6-30.) Dunlap's 
sister, Susan Nelson, testified regarding his behavior, explaining he was perceived as a "weird 
student" (id., p.49), with "weird, off-the-wall ideas, stories which, you know, you just kind of 
tend to dismiss on whether or not what he was saying was true" (id., p.51), and that people 
"thought he was crazy. They thought he was nuts. Thought he wasn't right or whatever" (id., 
p.52). Dunlap's mother, Patricia Henderson, discussed his behavior and her efforts to get Dunlap 
mental health assistance up to the time he left Madison prior to murdering Belinda in Ohio. (Id., 
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pp.75-98.) Patricia noted Dunlap's affect, explaining he "does not express himself. He keeps 
everything inside. He won't let you really know what he is feeling until we have this explosion. 
. . . He has never wanted to cry and he has never wanted to really express emotions after all of 
this started." (Id., p.99.) Dr. Beaver detailed Dunlap's mental health history (id., Vol.XI, pp.32-
38) and explained Dunlap's family had concerns as early as 1975 because he was "an odd duck 
from early on" (id., pp.32-33). 
Based upon the evidence presented at the resentencing, the evidence uncovered during 
post-conviction proceedings was cumulative. "Counsel's performance cannot be deemed 
deficient for failing to present cumulative evidence." Jones v. State, 949 So.2d 1021, 1036 (Fla. 
2006) (quotes and citation omitted); see also Rhoades v. Henry, 638 F.3d 1027, 1051 (9th Cir. 
2011 ) (quotes and citation omitted) ("much of the newly adduced evidence is cumulative, and 
adding it to what was already there would have made little difference). Even if there was 
noncumulative evidence uncovered by the SAPD, "the investigation and presentation of 
mitigating evidence by trial counsel was substantial and the fact that post-conviction lawyers 
have managed to find some that may be non-cumulative does not lead to a conclusion different 
from that of the post-conviction court, that [Dunlap's] trial counsel performed better than the 
Sixth Amendment requires." State v. McManus, 868 N.E.2d 778, 791 (Ind. 2007). 
Finally, based upon the cumulative nature of this new evidence and the strength of the 
state's case, Dunlap has failed to establish, even if the evidence had been presented, a reasonable 
probability the jury would have sentenced him to anything but death. See Amrine v. Bowersox, 
238 F.3d 1023,1031-32 (8 th Cir. 2001) ("Given the large amount of damaging evidence, there is 
no reasonable probability that the ultimate result of the penalty trial would have been different if 
Faith and Amrine's relatives had been called as mitigating witnesses"). 
89 
4. Connecting Mental Illness, Medication, And Behavior, And Presenting Evidence 
Of Mental Health Illness 
In two sub-claims, Dunlap contends counsel failed "to make the connection between [his] 
medications, behavior, and symptoms of mental illness" based upon a failure to 
"chronologically" review IMSI records, which, according to a new mental health expert, Dr. Don 
. Nelson, establishes a "correlation between [his] lack of medication and his severe symptoms of 
mental illness." (Brief, p.77.) Dunlap also contends counsel "should have organized IMSI 
records for their expert, Dr. Beaver, so they could present evidence to the jury connecting [his] 
medication to his symptoms of mental illness." (Brief, p.78.) Dr. Nelson's finding of an alleged 
correlation is based upon records from IMSI between February 2000 and February 2005 (#37270 
R., p.1 094, attach. 42, ppA-7), which were provided to Dr. Beaver well before the resentencing 
(id., attach. 41, attach. 4 at pp.1-2). These are not claims based upon Dr, Beaver being without 
the records to make the alleged correlation; rather, Dunlap contends counsel failed to provide the 
records in an organized fashion to Dr. Beaver. 
It appears counsel relied upon Dr. Beaver's prior knowledge of Dunlap's mental health 
history when they recommended he be appointed by the district court. It was during post-
conviction proceedings that Dr. Beaver first contended his compilation of records may have been 
incomplete. This was not the fault of counsel, but the fault of Dr. Beaver, which does not 
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Dunlap has failed to provide any authority 
establishing it was counsels' responsibility to organize the records in a manner preferred by Dr. 
Beaver such that the alleged correlation could immediately be recognized. Attorneys are not 
medical or mental health professionals who are expected to spoon-feed experts. They do not 
always know how to best organize a large volume of records such that experts can immediately 
recognize the importance of specific records. Rather, once the records have been provided, it is 
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the expert's responsibility to orgamze, review them, and provide an opinion regarding that 
review. Merely because Dr. Beaver failed to make the alleged correlation does not mean counsel 
. were ineffective. Moreover, based upon the strength of the state's case, Dunlap has failed to 
establish a reasonable probability the jury would have sentenced him to anything but death even 
if counsel had presented the evidence to Dr. Beaver in the fashion now desired. 
5. Challenging The State's "Malingering Theory" 
While unclear, Dunlap contends counsels' alleged failure to review IMSI records resulted 
in a failure to rebut the state's assertion that he was malingering. (Brief, pp.79-S0.) However, as 
detailed above, the IMSI records were provided to Dr. Beaver who apparently failed to recognize 
the alleged correlation between Dunlap's alleged mental illness problems when he was not 
medicated. Merely because Dunlap has secured a new expert and Dr. Beaver now contends the 
records were not properly organized does not establish deficient performance by his attorneys. 
Moreover, because counsel actually challenged the state's theory, Dunlap has failed to establish 
prejudice. As detailed above, both Drs. Beaver and Cunningham testified he was not 
malingering and Dr. Beaver noted other experts disagreed with his diagnosis (#32773 Tr.Vol.XI, 
p.S7), particularly Dr. Matthews (id., p.lOS). Not only did counsel challenge the state's theory, 
but further challenge would not have changed the outcome of Dunlap's sentencing. 
6. Rebutting Continuing Threat To Society 
Continuing to complain regarding the review and organization of IMsr records, Dunlap 
contends counsel were ineffective in failing to rebut the continuing threat to society aggravator 
because, allegedly, when Dunlap is properly medicated he is not dangerous. (Brief, pp.SO-S2.) 
However, it does not matter if Dunlap is "properly medicated" in determining the propensity 
aggravator, but simply whether "by prior conduct or conduct in the commission of the murder at 
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hand, [Dunlap] has exhibited a propensity to commit murder which will probably constitute a 
continuing threat to society." I.e. § 19-2515(9)(h). Dunlap murdering two completely innocent 
women within a span of days meets this aggravator irrespective of whether he is "properly 
medicated." Merely because Dunlap chose to not take proper medications does not establish the 
. propensity aggravator would have been rebutted. 
Dunlap also contends, based upon "the latest studies and the IMSI data," that an expert 
could have testified regarding Dunlap's "low risk of future dangerousness." (Brief, p.81.) As 
detailed above in section VII(C), Drs. Cunningham and Beaver testified regarding future 
dangerousness. Merely because Dunlap's post-conviction attorneys uncovered new experts to 
provide additional opinions based upon information provided to experts at the time of the 
resentencing does not mean counsel were ineffective, particularly since Dunlap was only entitled 
to one expert and had the windfall of two others, Drs. Cunningham and Pettis. See Leavitt, 646 
F.3d at 610. Moreover, based upon the overwhelming nature of the state's evidence, the de 
minimus nature of this "additional evidence," and the jury finding two other statutory 
aggravating factors that were weighed individually against the collective mitigation, Dunlap 
cannot establish prejudice. See Wood, 132 Idaho at 719-20; Hoffman, 236 F.3d at 541-42. 
7. Evidence From Caribou County Jail Personnel and Inmates 
Dunlap contends counsel should have investigated evidence from the Caribou County Jail 
regarding his "mental illness, remorse, and positive behavior during" the time he was housed in 
the jail. (Brief, p.82.) This evidence is cumulative of evidence presented to the jury regarding 
Dunlap'S background. While there may not have been significant evidence presented regarding 
Dunlap's incarceration at the jail from June 2005 through his resentencing, there was extensive 
information regarding his incarceration at IMSI and his behavior prior to that incarceration. 
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Dunlap has failed to meet his burden of establishing counsels' performance was both deficient 
and prejudicial based upon the information regarding Dunlap's short incarceration while in the 
Caribou County Jail awaiting resentencing. 
8. "Adequately" Arguing To Admit Dr. Estess' 1995 Treatment Notes 
Dunlap recognizes counsel attempted to introduce Dr. Estess' 1995 treatment notes 
(Brief, pp.82-83 (citing #32773 Tr.Vo1.11, pp.127-32)) and that the district court refused to 
admit the notes because they were connected to his 1992 report which formed the basis of 
Dunlap's resentencing, but contends counsel did not present "adequate" argument to secure 
admission of the 1995 notes. As explained above, counsel are not required to make arguments 
already rejected by the district court. Not only would admission of the notes have opened the 
door to unfavorable aggravating evidence which caused Dunlap to be resentenced in the first 
place, there can be little doubt it would have resulted in his contending counsel were ineffective 
for allowing the admission of this evidence because it opened the door to unfavorable 
aggravating evidence. See Brown v. Uttecht, 530 F.3d 1031, 1035 (9th Cir. 2008) (recognizing 
the importance of not opening the door to unfavorable evidence). As explained in section 
XXI(G) above, this establishes why tactical decisions of trial attorneys cannot be second-
guessed; they are "damned if they do and damned if they don't." Finally, because the district 
court properly concluded it would not have admitted the notes (#37270 R., p.1995), Dunlap 
cannot establish deficient performance or prejudice. 
9. Cross-Examining Matthews And Rebutting His Testimony 
Dunlap contends counsel were ineffective by failing to "adequately" cross-examine and 
rebut Dr. Matthews' testimony. (Brief, pp.83-87.) The district court correctly recognized that 
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cross-examination of Dr. Mathews "falls in the area of tactical or strategic decisions by counsel." 
(#37270 R., p.l995.) 
"[C]ounsel's choice of witnesses [and] manner of cross-examination ... fall within the 
area of tactical, or strategic, decisions." Giles v. State, 125 Idaho 921, 924,877 P.2d 365 (1994); 
see also Payne, 199 P.3d at 138 n.2 ("cross examination is a tactical decision"). "Although 
counsel's cross-examination may not have been as successful as he might have hoped, flawless 
cross-examination is rare. Strickland does not require perfect trial performance; it requires only 
competence." Sherron v. Norris, 69 F.3d 285, 290 (11 th Cir. 1995). "Counsel's representation 
must be only objectively reasonable, not flawless or to the highest degree of skill. Moreover, 
counsel's tactical decisions at trial, such as refraining from cross-examining a particular witness 
or from asking a particular line of questions are given great deference and must similarly meet 
only objectively reasonable standards." Dows v. Wood, 211 F.3d 480, 487 (9th Cir. 2000); see 
also Brown, 530 F.3d at 1036 ("great deference" is afforded counsel in cross-examining experts 
and noting post-trial critiques of cross-examination "might well have backfired"). 
Based only upon the contention Dr. Matthews misstated the number of times Dunlap was 
seen by Dr. Kenneth Khatain, Dunlap contends counsel were ineffective. (Brief, p.83.) How 
establishing Dr. Matthews allegedly erred in stating the number of times Dunlap was seen by Dr. 
Khatain would have changed the outcome of the sentencing is a mystery, particularly since when 
Dr. Matthews was asked, "And those arc people who meet with Tim on a monthly basis," he 
replied, "I didn't see a month-by-month record from this doctor. I saw about five notes over the 
course of about five years. So how often he actually met with him and what the frequency of his 
meetings were, I don't actually know. I do know there were times that he would not meet with 
them because Mr. Dunlap didn't want do [sic] meet them." (#32773 Tr.Vol.XXI, pp.l74-75.) 
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Based upon this clarification, it is difficult to fathom how additional questioning regarding the 
, number of times Dr. Khatain saw Dunlap would have done anything but antagonize the jury. 
Dunlap's reliance upon Dr. Beaver's new ignorance regarding Doten's report is not 
supported by the record. During cross-examination, Dr. Beaver was questioned as follows: 
Q. One of those people was Dr. David Dalton (phonetic). Do you 
recall that time? 
A. Well, he is a social worker not a doctor. 
Q. Wasn't he also called upon to undertake an assessment of Tim 
Dunlap's mental status at the time, 16 and 17 of October, correct? 
A. Yes, he did. 
Q. And in that particular situation, did he come up with an AXIS I 
diagnosis like you did? 
Q. Do you agree with his assessment on that occasion? 
A. Well, he was operating with a limited amount of information and 
relying pretty exclusively on what Tim Dunlap told him that evening that he 
evaluated him and viewed him as having major personality disorders at the time 
in his discussions. Also in that same record he goes on to talk about Tim 
Dunlap's --
Q. I asked you if you agree or disagree with him? 
A. And I don't think I can answer that yes or no. 
(#32773 Tr.Vol.XI, pp.83-85.) Dr. Beaver was again questioned regarding his understanding of 
Doten's report, handed a copy, and asked numerous questions regarding its content. (ld., pp.109-
11.) Dr. Beaver was clearly familiar with Doten's report. 
Dunlap has also failed to establish Dr. Matthews was not entitled to rely upon the 
information contained in Doten's report. Dr. Beaver's opinion regarding the validity of Doten's 
report is not the issue; the issue is whether it was appropriate for Dr. Matthews to consider the 
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report in developing his opinion. As explained in LR.E. 703, "If of a type reasonably relied upon 
by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or 
data need not be admissible in evidence in order for the opinion or inference to be admitted." 
While Dr. Beaver may criticize Doten's report, it was not improper for Dr. Matthews to consider 
the information in developing his own opinion, particularly since Doten's educational experience 
- master's degree - did not disqualify him from rendering opinions. See I.R.E. 702; State v. 
Willis, 888 P.2d 839, 84S (Kansas 1995); State v. Guidry, 647 So.2d S02, S08 (La. 1994). 
Dunlap's contention regarding the difference between criminal responsibility and moral 
culpability (Brief, pp.84-8S) is similar to his claim regarding the "nexus requirement" discussed 
in section X(D)(3). There was no basis for objecting to the prosecutor's questions because the 
prosecutor was not precluded from challenging the weight the jury should give to the mitigation 
by explaining there was no connection between his mental illness and the murders. Moreover, 
based upon the instruction given regarding mitigation, Dunlap cannot establish prejudice. In 
relevant part, the instruction states, "A mitigating factor does not have to constitute a defense or 
excuse or justification for the crime, nor does it even have to reduce the degree of the 
defendant's blame for the crime. Mitigating factors may include any fact or circumstance that 
inspires sympathy, compassion or mercy for the defendant." (#32773 R.Supp.VoU, p.19.) 
Irrespective of counsels' performance regarding criminal responsibility and moral culpability, 
the outcome of Dunlap's sentence would not have changed. 
Dunlap complains Dr. Matthews' report was not provided to Dr. Beaver until February 
14, 2006, after sentencing had commenced. (Brief, p.8S.) However, Dr. Matthews' report was 
not completed until February 13, 2006 (#37270 R., p.1094, attach. 41, attach.7), because Dr. 
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Beaver's report was not completed until January 13, 2006 (id., attach. 41, attach. 4), and his 
second report was not completed until January 25, 2006 (id., attach. 41, attach. 6). 
Neither is there a requirement that Dr. Beaver restate, in rebuttal, his opposition to Dr. 
Matthews' opinions; Dr. Beaver's opposition was provided during Dunlap's case-in-chief, and 
Dunlap has failed to rebut the presumption that counsel chose not to risk irritating the jury by 
. simply rehashing testimony previously provided. The same is true regarding other IMSI mental 
health professionals. As Dr. Beaver explained to the jury, he was not surprised by the reports of 
Dr. Sombke regarding Dunlap's past behavior being purposeful because "Mr. Dunlap has done 
that several times during his history." (#32773 Tr.Vol.XI, p.136.) Therefore, irrespective of 
whether Dr. Sombke had testified, there was significant evidence Dunlap was malingering. Dr. 
Beaver also discussed Dr. Khatain's diagnosis, which was the same as Dr. Beaver's diagnosis. 
(Id. at p.13 7.) Based upon the entirety of the evidence presented by counsel, it is difficult to 
fathom how the additional witnesses Dunlap now lists would have changed the outcome of his 
. sentence because it is merely more cumulative evidence. 
10. Letter Written By Dunlap To Tonya's Husband 
Dunlap contends counsel were ineffective for failing to introduce a letter he allegedly 
wrote to Jeff Crane, Tonya's husband. (Brief, pp.87-88.) Because Dunlap never provided the 
district court with a copy of a letter written by Dunlap to Jeff, there is no admissible evidence to 
support the claim. See Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 794-95. Even if the letter had been presented 
to the district court, Dunlap cannot overcome the fact that counsel did not present the letter 
because it was cumulative. When asked why the letter was not admitted, Parmenter explained, 
. "Maybe because we had already done a lot. I mean, we -- as I recall, I am trying to remember if 
we submitted something in writing. I thought we had. You know, we had already submitted 
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quite a bit of evidence regarding remorse. So it might have been a little redundant." (#37270 R., 
p.1094, attach. 2, pp.202-03.) During his allocution Dunlap repeatedly expressed remorse for 
having murdered Tonya, stating, "I cannot change the past, and today admit I am very sorry for 
this," "I am but a man who thought he was pushed to the edge of desperation, living in dire 
straits" (#32773 Tr.Vol.XII, p.12), "I know I have remorse but the steel and concrete of being 
locked away have drained me of emotions that I have left" (id. at p.13), "I don't want you to 
think I am trying to excuse what I have done. I am not. Nor am I trying to lessen the fact that 
two women are dead. I am sorry for what I have done but that won't bring them back or lessen 
the grief of their families who is [sic] sitting in this courtroom today" (id.), "So I would like to 
say I am sorry. I wish to God I hadn't shot your daughters. I don't know if it was because of the 
sickness, the mental illness I had, but I would like to say that I am very sorry for what I did .... " 
(id., p.18), and "I am sorry I killed Tonya Crane and Belinda Bolanos" (id. at p.25). 
K. The Manner In Which Counsel Chose To Present Evidence 
Dunlap chides counsels' decision to present exhibits A through Y - Dunlap's "social 
history" - without live testimony, and the testimony of Terry Clem, Dunlap's first grade teacher 
(#32773 Tr. Vol. V III , pp.30-43), Dr. Cunningham (id. at pp.45-100; Vol.lX, pp.l18-64) and 
Judge Richard Striegel (id., Vol.lX, pp.166-206) via deposition. (Brief, pp.88-92.) Addressing 
exhibits A through Y, the district court recognized this was a trial tactic that is unassailable 
because there is no indication of lack of preparation. (#37270 R., p.2003.) Addressing the 
deposition testimony, the court again recognized this was a strategic decision and Dunlap failed 
to establish prejudice. (Id., p.1990.) 
As explained in Giles, 125 Idaho at 924, "counsel's choice of witnesses, manner of cross-
examination, and lack of objections to testimony fall within the area of tactical or strategic, 
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decisions, as does counsel's presentation of medical evidence." In Ries v. Quarterman, 522 F.3d 
'517, 527 (5 th Cir. 2008), the petitioner challenged the admission of exhibits admitted into 
evidence and available for the jury's view without live testimony, but, according to petitioner, 
used "ineptly, failing to construct a compelling case for mitigation based on a graphic description 
of Ries's abuse-filled social history." The court recognized, "The claim here boils down to a 
disagreement with the manner and style in which trial counsel elected to present mitigating 
evidence, a choice which appears to have been strategic." Id. at 528. Dunlap has also failed to 
overcome the presumption that counsels' strategic decision fell within the wide range of 
reasonable professional assistance. And Dunlap's attempt to resuscitate this claim with 
affidavits regarding the impact of the exhibits on the jury or their use by the jury constitutes 
twenty-twenty hindsight and violates I.R.E. 606(b); obviously, counsel had no way of knowing 
at the time the decision was made how the jury would use the exhibits or the impact on the jury. 
Dunlap fails to explain how live testimony would have made the exhibits more relevant. 
(Brief, p.89.) For example, Dunlap fails to explain how live testimony would have made his 
birth certificate more relevant to his mitigation case. (#32773 R., p.733, exhibit B.) Dunlap also 
fails to demonstrate how "live testimony" discussing the exhibits would have changed the 
outcome of his sentence, particularly since Parmenter recognized Dunlap's history and 
background had been fairly presented through family testimony. (#37270 R., p.l094, attach. 2, 
p.230.) Such long, tedious, and cumulative testimony would have had no more impact on the 
jury than the documents themselves. Counsel advised the jury of the exhibits, that they were 
indexed, and that the exhibits were designed to provide them "[ a] history of who Tim Dunlap is, 
and to give [them] a better feel for who [they] were dealing with." (#32773 Tr.Vo1.XII, p.59.) 
Dunlap also fails to explain how or which "live witness" should have presented the exhibits, 
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making his claim merely conclusory. Based upon the opportunity the jury had to review the 
documents and Dunlap's failure to explain how or who would have presented the testimony, he 
failed to establish a reasonable probability that the outcome of his sentence would have changed. 
The only testimony read was the prior post-conviction testimony of Dr. Cunningham; the 
other two witnesses' depositions were on videotape and viewed by the jury. Therefore, Dunlap's 
complaint regarding the jury's ability to assess credibility is without merit. Moreover, the only 
way Dr. Cunningham's testimony could have been presented was by reading his prior testimony, 
which was based upon a stipulation with the state since the court denied Dunlap's motion to have 
him appointed and testify live. (#32773 Tr.Vo1.V, pp.l0-II.) Because this was a tactical 
decision, Dunlap has failed to establish deficient performance. See O'Geary v. State, 2007 WL 
3085698, *4 (Iowa App. 2007) (unpublished) (when the trial court quashed the defendant's 
subpoena, counsel properly made the strategic decision to request the use of her deposition 
testimony in lieu of live testimony, which was a "reasonable decision"). As explained in 
Coleman v. State, 546 N.E.2d 827, 830 (Ind. 1989), counsel may have simply felt Dunlap was 
"better off' having the witnesses' testimony submitted by deposition rather than by live 
testimony. "An appellate court will not second-guess an attorney on tactical decisions." Id. 
Dunlap has also failed to establish prejudice because there is no evidence any of the 
witnesses would have deviated from prior testimony or that the outcome of his sentence would 
, have been different had the witnesses testified "live." See State v. Yaw, 398 N.W.2d 803, 807 
(Iowa 1987). As recognized in Thompson v. State, 958 S.W.2d 156, 167 (Tenn. Crim. App. 
1997), "any claim of prejudice in this case would also qualify as mere speCUlation." It is 
certainly conceivable that had any of the three witnesses appeared before the jury their 
presentation may have been less compelling because of the stress and nervousness associated 
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with appearing m a courtroom full of people before a judge and jury, which is why it is 
unacceptable to guess what might have happened had the witnesses appeared live before the jury. 
Finally, Dunlap misconstrues his burden by contending the district court's decision 
resulted in it becoming "a thirteenth juror in deciding the persuasive impact witness testimony 
would have had on trial jurors." (Brief, p.92) (emphasis omitted). As explained by this Court: 
When an action will be tried before the court without a jury, the trial court as the 
trier of fact is entitled to arrive at the most probable inferences based upon the 
undisputed evidence properly before it and grant the summary judgment despite 
the possibility of conflicting inferences. The test for reviewing the inferences 
drawn by the trial court is whether the record reasonably supports the inferences. 
Pizzuto, 146 Idaho at 727 (quotes and citations omitted). 
The district court did not err by making reasonable inferences based upon the evidence 
presented and concluding Dunlap failed to meet his burden of establishing "a prima facie case as 
to each element of [StricklandJ." Id. 
L. Counsels' Decision To Not Attend Dunlap'S Interview With Matthews 
Dunlap contends counsel were ineffective in failing to advise him regarding the interview 
with Dr. Matthews and allegedly failing to attend the interview with him. (Brief, pp.92-94.) The 
district court recognized because Dunlap raised the issue of his mental health, he waived any 
objection to being examined by a state expert and had no right to the presence of counsel during 
Dr. Matthews' interview. (#37270 R., p.2004.) 
Dunlap's argument is premised upon Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 470 (1981), and 
Hoffman, 236 F.3d at 538. However, neither Estelle nor Hoffman have been extended to cases 
, where the defendant raised his mental health as an issue and by doing so, waived any objection 
to being examined by a state expert. See Payne, 199 P .3d at 152. "A defendant has the right to 
the assistance of counsel, as opposed to the presence of counsel, during a compelled mental 
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examination." Id. In Estrada, 143 Idaho at 562 (emphasis omitted), this Court discussed Estelle, 
noting the difference between a Sixth Amendment right to counsel before submitting to an 
_ interview and the right to assistance of counsel during such an interview, and concluded, "This 
Court's finding that a Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel in the critical stage of a 
psychosexual evaluation inquiring [in]to a defendant's future dangerousness, does not 
necessarily require the presence of counsel during the exam." See also U.S. v. Byers, 740 F.2d 
.1104,1118 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("[A]t the psychiatric interview itself, he was not confronted by the 
procedural system; he had no decision in the nature of legal strategy or tactics to make - not 
even, as we have seen, the decision whether to refuse, on Fifth Amendment grounds, to answer 
the psychiatrist's questions. The only conceivable role for counsel at the examination would 
have been to observe"); People v. Chung, 793 N.Y.S.2d 323, 326 (N.Y. Sup. 2005) ("[T]he 
general consensus to be found among the various jurisdictions is that there is no federal or state 
constitutional right to counsel at a psychiatric examination") (citing cases). Additionally, 
counsel may not have attended the entirety of the interview based upon a strategic decision 
believing Dunlap would be more forthcoming and provide greater assistance to his case if 
counsel were not present. Because Dunlap has not even attempted to overcome the presumption 
that counsel made a reasonable tactical decision, his claim fails. 
Dunlap's contention that counsel failed to advise him regarding the interview is not only 
being raised for the first time on appeal, but is factually incorrect. As explained by Archibald, "I 
looked through the jail window and I remember talking with Tim, making sure he remembered 
what this was about. That the judge had ordered an interview with the expert and that if he had 
any question about what was going to happen." (#37270 R., p.1094, attach. 3, p.39.) 
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Finally, Dunlap has completely failed to address how counsels' presence at the interview 
would have changed the outcome of his sentence. Because Dunlap is required to establish both 
deficient performance and prejudice, his claim fails. 
M. Counsels' Decision To Not Have Dunlap Medicated 
Dunlap contends counsel were ineffective by choosing to not have him medicated at the 
time of his resentencing. (Brief, pp.94-96.) Rejecting this claim, the district court concluded 
counsel had conducted adequate investigation and made a strategic decision to not have Dunlap 
medicated at the resentencing and that even if he had been medicated the outcome of his 
resentencing would not have changed. (Motion Augment, Appendix A, pp.44-46, augmented by 
this Court on August 25, 2011.) 
Counsel were aware Dunlap had previously received Haldol. (#37270 R., p.1 094, attach. 
2, exhibits 3-16.) Based upon information from Dr. Beaver that "Haldol would put [Dunlap] to 
sleep" (id., exhibit 15, bate #11880) and Parmenter's experience with cases from State Hospital 
South, counsel made a strategic decision to not have him medicated. Parmenter explained: 
A. Going back to my note with Dr. Beaver, he indicated that Haldol 
would tend to make Tim drowsy, less responsive. 
Yeah, I think it was a strategic move to keep him as alert as we could have 
him. And, you know, I think part of our case was to not have him necessarily 
medicated as we approached trial. I think we discussed that as a team. 
Q. To not have him medicated? 
A. Right. 
Q. And why would that be? 
A. . Because the less he is medicated, the more the jury could see what 
he was really like. The issues, some of the bizarreness. 
(ld., attach. 2, pp.75-76.) 
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Parmenter further noted Haldol "tends to make people drowsy, as I recall. That is the one 
thing that I remember about it." (rd., p.284.) Parmenter agreed, "that is not something [he] 
wanted to present to the jury" because they "wanted Tim alert first of all so he could assist and 
help with the trial and we could have his input. And secondly, I thought that it would be more 
appropriate -- I recall as a defense team speaking about that, talking to Dr. Beaver that should we 
have him medicated or not medicated. And ultimately we decided not to have him medicated." 
(Id., pp.284-85.) Archibald confirmed they discussed the issue of whether the jury should see 
Dunlap without having taken medications, explaining, "There was discussion, yes, about how 
Tim was on the day of the murder. So it was my suggestion that he go off his meds so that we 
could see -- so that he could take his tests because of the LQ .... I wanted him to take his tests 
and yes, if the jury could see him as he was on the day of the murder, then I think that would 
help the jury see how mentally ill he was." (#37270 R., p.1094, attach. 3, p.246.) 
Based upon notes from his file, his prior history with State Hospital South, and his 
discussions with Dr. Beaver, Parmenter had sufficient information to make a reasonable tactical 
decision. While Archibald learned refusing Dunlap all medications "would be bad for him. We 
can't do that. So I left it to the medical professionals" (#37270 R., p.1094, attach. 3, p.247), 
Parmenter, who was lead counsel, reasonably concluded Dunlap should not be given Haldol. 
Dunlap further contends "[c]ounsels' failure to ensure [he] received his bi-weekly Haldol 
injections likely rendered [him] psychotic during the sentencing" and "unable to meaningfully 
assist trial counsel in preparing for the sentencing." (Brief, p.96.) While Dunlap uses the word 
"likely," he fails to establish there were any actual signs of psychosis or inability to assist 
counsel. Dr. Beaver was equivocal, concluding: 
Mr. Dunlap was taking Klonopin while at the Caribou County jail. Klonopin has 
a sedating effect, and may well have dampened any signs of psychosis which 
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would likely have developed as a result of failing to provide Mr. Dunlap with 
Haldol or other antipsychotic medications. Thus, Mr. Dunlap could well have 
been experiencing psychosis prior to and during his resentencing trial, without 
exhibiting the overt signs he had exhibited at IMSI after discontinuation of 
Haldol. 
(#37270 R., pol 094, attach. 41, p.2) (emphasis added). 
Likewise, Dr. Eljorn Nelson, merely opined, "the inappropriate administration of 
Cogentin may have interfered with Mr. Dunlap's ability to think clearly, organize his thoughts, 
speak clearly, and communicate effectively." (#37270 R., pol094, attach. 42, p.8) (emphasis 
added). "May" and "could" do not establish Dunlap was psychotic, an opinion conspicuously 
absent from any expert report or affidavit, but is merely speculative evidence entitled to little 
weight. See Leavitt, 646 F.3d at 614; Rhoades v. Henry, 638 F.3d 1027, 10S0 (9th Cir. 2011). 
Counsels' performance was not deficient nor has Dunlap established how the outcome of his 
sentence would have been different even if counsel had challenged the medications given. 
N. Counsels' Advice And Preparation For His Allocution 
Dunlap contends counsel were ineffective by failing to assist him in preparing his 
allocution and reading the statement he prepared prior to it being read to the jury. (Brief, pp.96-
99.) The district court concluded Dunlap failed to establish deficient performance or prejudice. 
(#37270 R., ppol98S-86.) 
"A statement of allocution is an unsworn statement from a convicted defendant to the 
sentencing judge or jury in which the defendant can ask for mercy, explain his or her conduct, 
apologize for the crime, or say anything else in an effort to lessen the impending sentence." 
u.s. v. Jackson, S49 F.3d 963, 980 n.22 (Sth Cir. 2008) (quotes and citation omitted) (emphasis 
added). The right of allocution "has a time honored place in the jurisprudence of most American 
states" and "is a traditional common-law right of the criminal defendant which was recognized as 
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early as 1689." State v. Gervasi, 138 Idaho 813, 815-16, 69 P.3d 1074 (Ct. App. 2003). "While 
a denial of allocution has not been held to constitute a denial of due process under the United 
States Constitution," it is sufficiently important "that a court's failure to meet its obligation to 
allow a defendant the opportunity of allocution should be subject to challenge on appeal as 
fundamental error." Id. at 816; but see State v. Nez, 130 Idaho 950, 958, 950 P.2d 1289 (Ct. 
App. 1997) (the Supreme Court "has not yet expressly recognized a constitutional basis for the 
right of allocution") (citing McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 217 (1071 ». 
It is difficult to understand how counsels' performance was deficient or prejudicial, 
particularly since they discussed the issue with him and did not have time to review what he had 
prepared because he did not timely give them a copy. (#37270 R., attach. 3, p.264.) Further, 
counsel clearly did not have the ability to control what was said by Dunlap. As explained by 
Parmenter, "he read from his written statement and then he tended to ramble on after that. I 
think he followed it for a while and then started saying some other things." (Id., attach. 2, 
p.274.) As explained in Row, 131 Idaho at 312, "Trial counsel's decisions concerning Row's 
mental health and her allocution statement were strictly strategic and shall not be second-guessed 
by this Court." See also Payne, 199 P.3d at 153 (denying relief on a claim that counsel 
improperly advised him to allocute because "[t]hese arguments are nothing more than taking 
issue with his trial counsel's tactical and strategic choices"). Even if the allocution was not as 
artful as Dunlap would now like, he has failed to establish the outcome of his sentence would 
have been different. He has failed to explain exactly what portions were allegedly so devastating 
that they resulted in him receiving the death penalty. 
106 
XXII. 
Dunlap Has Failed To Establish The District Court Was Influenced By Personal Commitments 
To Grant The State's Motion For Summary Dismissal 
As his crescendo, Dunlap attempts to resurrect his claim of judicial bias by reasserting 
Judge Harding was improperly "motivated, at least in part, by his intent to go on a pre-planned 
mission" for the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, which he left to serve six days after 
issuing the order dismissing Dunlap's claims. (Brief, pp.99-100.) Judge Brown denied Dunlap's 
, motion, recognizing the information in support of Dunlap's motion 
amounts to nothing more than suspicion, surmise, speculation, innuendo and 
statements of mere conclusion arising from the fact that Judge Harding ruled 
adverse to Dunlap on the dual motions for summary dismissal and then shortly 
thereafter left to serve a mission for his church. There is absolutely no evidence 
that Judge Harding's decision in this matter was in any fashion influenced by the 
fact that he planned to serve a mission for his church in November 2009. 
(#37270 R.Supp.Vol.I, p.212.) 
The state incorporates its argument from section XVIII above and submits there is no 
evidence suppOliing Dunlap's contention that Judge Harding's plan to serve a church mission 
influenced his decision to grant the state's Motion for Summary Dismissal. Rather, as with 
many of his claims and arguments, Dunlap's contention is based upon mere speculation. There 
is simply no basis to believe Judge Harding would not have recused himself and had the case 
assigned to another judge to conduct an evidentiary hearing if he believed it was warranted. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that Dunlap's death sentence and the district court's 
Memorandum Decision and Order denying post-conviction relief be affi 
DA TED this 20th day of September, 20 
Deputy Attorney General and 
Chief, Capital Litigation Unit 
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